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Abstract 
 
 Throughout the course of Canadian political history, many prairie populist 
movements have developed in an attempt to address the concerns of western Canadians.  
Two examples of these populist movements are the Social Credit Party, which was 
predominantly successful in forming government in Alberta, and the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the precursor of today’s New Democratic Party and 
well-known for its implementation of Medicare under Saskatchewan CCF premier 
Tommy Douglas.   
 However, there are elements of western populist movements that are not well 
known and have not been documented to a significant extent.  The Social Credit Party, 
for example, is known for its charismatic leader, William Aberhart, and his landslide 
victory in Alberta’s 1935 election; however, Social Credit’s appeal beyond Alberta has 
not been well documented.  In the Saskatchewan general election of 1938, Social Credit 
swept into the province in an attempt to gain power and implement its monetary reform 
policies, believing that Saskatchewan, like Alberta, would be a good fit for Social Credit 
as both provinces were suffering from the Great Depression.  This thesis will examine 
Social Credit and the 1938 Saskatchewan provincial election.  It will also discuss why 
Social Credit did not have success in this election, and the factors that contributed to this 
lack of victory.  It will also examine the other political actors during this election 
campaign, and why the Liberal Party was able to achieve re-election. 
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1  
Introduction 
 
Adventurers and Opportunists: The Social Credit Party in the Saskatchewan 
election of 1938 
 
 In 1938, fresh from its spectacular success in the Alberta provincial election, the 
Social Credit Party swept into neighbouring Saskatchewan, hoping to topple another 
sitting government in Depression-era Canada.  Social Credit was a populist political 
movement which entered the Saskatchewan election of 1938 believing that because it was 
popular in Alberta, it would be popular in Saskatchewan as well.  Saskatchewan was not 
alone in receiving the attention of the Social Creditors; in fact, Social Credit ran 
candidates in both Manitoba and British Columbia, beginning in the 1936 and 1937 
elections, respectively, where it found limited success.  Clearly, Social Credit’s 
expansion outside of Alberta was a concerted effort, and it made sense to party leaders 
that Social Credit would find success in neighbouring western provinces, all of whom 
were struggling with the effects of the Great Depression, especially Saskatchewan. 
 The Social Credit movement was founded in the early 1930s in Alberta in an 
effort to pull the western provinces of Canada, and Alberta in particular, out of the Great 
Depression.  It has been described as “the first radical reform administration in the 
history of Canada.”1 It promised to “end poverty in the midst of plenty”, primarily by 
using government as a tool to regulate credit, enact price controls and prevent mortgage 
foreclosures.2  Its leader, William Aberhart, was a teacher who later became pastor of the 
Bible Institute Baptist Church in Calgary.3  In an effort to stimulate the economy, 
Aberhart and Social Credit also promised Albertans “that the application of Social Credit 
                                                 
1 Lewis H. Thomas, William Aberhart and the Social Credit in Alberta (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing, 
1977), 9. 
2 Thomas, Aberhart and Social Credit, 70-71. 
3 Thomas, Aberhart and Social Credit, 16-17. 
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principles would permit the payment of $25.00 per month to each citizen as a dividend”.4  
The strength of these ideas allowed Social Credit to sweep the governing United Farmers 
of Alberta from office.  With this success, Aberhart believed that the winning conditions 
which had been present in Alberta also existed in Saskatchewan, and Social Credit 
proceeded to begin organizing in Saskatchewan and preparing for the next general 
election in that province. 
 But the Social Credit Party was rejected, winning only two seats, while the 
Liberal Party under Premier William Patterson remained in government.  The question is 
why?  Social Credit believed that the winning conditions were all present in 
Saskatchewan, much like they had been in Alberta just three years earlier in 1935.  
Additionally, Social Credit had already found success in the Canadian federal election of 
1935, winning not only the bulk of the seats in Alberta (fifteen) but also two in 
Saskatchewan.  The Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan, largely running on the 
same policies as the Alberta branch of the Social Credit movement, is an integral element 
in understanding the political culture in Saskatchewan and the nature of prairie populist 
political movements in general during the 1930s.  This thesis will examine why the 
Social Credit Party ran candidates in the 1938 Saskatchewan provincial election (even 
though the Social Credit Party was an Albertan creation), how and why it fared in that 
election, and most importantly, why the Social Credit involvement is treated today as 
little more than an aberration or footnote in Saskatchewan political history.  This thesis 
will use ask the analytical tool of “failure” to further demonstrate why Social Credit was 
not successful in this election. 
                                                 
4 Thomas, Aberhart and Social Credit, 61. 
  
 
3  
 Literature which is critical to understanding Social Credit’s appearance in 
Saskatchewan includes political scientist David Smith’s Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal 
Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71.  In his book, Smith argues that “Social Credit was 
eminently suited to damage the CCF’s fortunes.  Competition with another party or 
league (as its supporters insisted on calling it) having a full slate of candidates was 
unlikely to help a struggling new party at any time but in this instance it was particularly 
harmful because Social Credit appealed to many farmers”.5  Significant parallels can be 
drawn between Alberta and Saskatchewan at this stage in Canadian political history.  
Both were dealing with the Great Depression, and both were looking for political options 
that would help them get out of the Depression.  Social Credit became widely popular in 
Alberta due to its populist message of prosperity directed at suffering Albertans; indeed 
Smith notes that “because of William Aberhart’s victory in Alberta in the summer of 
1935, Social Credit appeared to have every claim to the title of a successful western 
protest party.”6  For this reason, Social Credit organizers thought that the movement 
would be popular in Saskatchewan, a province dealing with similar concerns. 
 Political scientist Denis Smith’s Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. 
Diefenbaker discusses the election itself in limited detail: “three parties dominated the 
contest: the governing Liberals, the CCF, and Social Credit.  Only the Liberals nominated 
a full slate.  Social Credit came closest to that, with forty-one candidates, and the CCF 
named thirty-one.”7  Indeed, just by looking at these numbers one can see that Social 
Credit was going to play a large role in the campaign.  Another example of a published 
                                                 
5 David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1975), 225. 
6 Smith, Prairie Liberalism, 225. 
7 Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto: MacFarlane, Walter 
and Ross, 1995), 97. 
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work that discusses the election is Dick Spencer’s Singing the Blues: The Conservatives 
in Saskatchewan, which argues that “the wild card in the 1938 election was the new – and 
in Saskatchewan largely unknown – Social Credit Party, an oddball import from 
Alberta.”8  In addition, Spencer lays out the idea that William Aberhart, Premier of 
Alberta, personally spearheaded the decision for Social Credit to contest the election, and 
indeed led the campaign himself, with thousands of people listening to his message at 
impassioned rallies all across Saskatchewan.   
 However, as Spencer goes on to argue, “Premier Patterson’s Liberals fought back, 
likening the Social Credit invasion to German and Italian fascist tactics.  British 
democracy was endangered, they warned, matching Social Credit hyperbole with hot 
jingoist gusts of their own.”9 Spencer implies that Social Credit was framed by the 
Liberals as a threat not only to democracy but also to the Saskatchewan way of life.  Two 
factors contributed to the governing Liberal’s successful repulsion of Social Credit: first, 
the fact that they successfully branded Social Credit as being frightening due to its radical 
economic theory during the Great Depression, and secondly, that it was painted as being 
dangerous fascist invaders.  A side-note that Spencer mentions is that in branding Social 
Credit as dangerous, Premier Patterson’s Liberals used the same kind of rhetoric Social 
Credit was using. 
 Some excellent general histories include Bill Waiser’s Saskatchewan: A New 
History.  In it, Waiser argues that Social Credit portrayed itself in the election as a force 
that would free the province from the Great Depression: “fresh from its overwhelming 
victory in the 1935 Alberta election and its impressive success in the 1935 federal 
                                                 
8 Dick Spencer, Singing the Blues: The Conservatives in Saskatchewan (Regina: University of Regina, 
Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2007), 76.  
9 Spencer, Singing the Blues, 77. 
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election, the party moved into Saskatchewan with its seductive monetary theory, 
portraying itself as a force that would liberate the province from the shackles of the Great 
Depression.”10  Waiser also supports Spencer’s view on how Social Credit was 
characterized by the other parties, particularly the governing Liberals, as “both the 
Liberals and CCF responded [to Social Credit] by characterizing Alberta premier William 
Aberhart as a despot intent on ruling the province from Edmonton.”11   
 Additional scholarly journal articles include Kenneth Andrews’ “‘Progressive 
Counterparts’ of the CCF: Social Credit and the Conservative Party in Saskatchewan, 
1935-1938”, Journal of Canadian Studies.  Andrews argues that Social Credit’s role in 
Saskatchewan politics is critical in fully understanding the political character of the 
province at the time.  Andrews writes that “Saskatchewan politics in the 1930s was 
frequently a complicated and confusing scene.  At the time, a variety of political parties 
vied for pre-eminence as the major opposition to the governing Liberal Party.”12  
Andrews largely echoes what other historians have written on the subject of Social Credit 
in Saskatchewan.  He further goes on to state that  
Social Credit became subject to the political fracture of ‘progressive’ sentiment 
in the province.  Saskatchewan was not an open political field; the origins and 
dynamics of political protest had evolved much differently there than in Alberta.  
The result was that Social Credit had to compete on a different set of terms.  
Once Social Credit decided to enter Saskatchewan, it found itself competing 
against established ‘progressive’ political forces in the province.  From these it 
could never entirely disassociate itself.13 
 
Andrews argues that Saskatchewan developed differently than Alberta due to political 
factors.  He especially puts forward the idea that the rise to power of the United Farmers 
                                                 
10 William Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary: Fifth House, 2005), 324. 
11 Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History, 324. 
12 Ken Andrews, “‘Progressive’ Counterparts of the CCF: Social Credit and the Conservative Party in 
Saskatchewan, 1935-1938” Journal of Canadian Studies (17, no.3 1982), 58. 
13 Andrews, “‘Progressive’ Counterparts of the CCF”, 59. 
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of Alberta (UFA) political movement in 1921 caused a major disruption to Alberta 
politics which Saskatchewan did not undergo until later.14  Saskatchewan voters instead 
stuck with political stability and traditional parties until the CCF won the 1944 election 
and changed the province.  This idea supports the theory that Social Credit had a much 
different political environment to deal with when it first attempted to expand into 
Saskatchewan; Alberta voters were more used to radical change already, whereas 
Saskatchewan voters were far more likely to stick with the dominant Liberal Party.   
 Further materials that have contributed to this thesis include Jared Wesley’s Code 
Politics: Campaigns and Cultures on the Canadian Prairies.  In this work, Wesley 
focuses largely on the campaigns themselves.  However, he does talk about broader 
issues; he puts forward the idea that Premier Patterson’s Liberals were largely supportive 
of centralization of government in order to serve as a check to the perceived threat that 
Social Credit was attempting to “usurp” the power of the federal government.15  Wesley 
provides a different kind of approach to looking at politics than other scholars.  He views 
political ‘cultures’ as being critical to understanding why Alberta and Saskatchewan 
developed differently.  He likens Alberta political culture to “cowboy individualism”, 
while Saskatchewan’s political culture can be seen to speak to the values of “co-
operation, community and equality.”16   
 It is highly unlikely that one who believes in the spirit of ‘cowboy individualism’, 
as Wesley puts it, would vote for a party espousing the ideas of a social security net or 
universal health care.  Wesley builds on the work of scholars such as Andrews by trying 
                                                 
14 Andrews, “‘Progressive’ Counterparts of the CCF”, 22. 
15 Jared J. Wesley, Code Politics: Campaigns and Cultures on the Canadian Prairies, (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2011), 122. 
16 Wesley, Code Politics, 18. 
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to nail down the differences between Alberta and Saskatchewan in explaining why the 
two provinces developed the way that they did.  He further expands his analysis to 
immigrant patterns on the prairies, stating that “over time, British-born Labourites rose to 
prominence in Saskatchewan, and American frontier liberals gained authority in 
Alberta.”17  Lewis Thomas’ William Aberhart and Social Credit in Alberta, meanwhile, 
focuses on discussing William Aberhart and Alberta specifically, and on Aberhart’s 
conflicts with the authority of the federal government.18  However, he does discuss Social 
Credit monetary policy, such as the ‘prosperity certificates’, a form of scrip (currency 
substitute) issued by the government.19   
 As David Smith argues, discussing the aftermath of the 1938 election in Prairie 
Liberalism, “Social Credit was vanquished, being able to elect only two of its forty-one 
candidates, although it received nearly 16 percent of the total vote.”20  Instead, the 
political party that found itself ascendant was the CCF.  It emerged from the election 
strong, while Social Credit seemed to be more of a spent force.21  Smith sums up the next 
six years from 1938 to the next election in 1944 in a way which makes it easy to 
understand: “In six years the CCF had carved out a role for itself in the opposition.  
Compared to the blitzkrieg of Social Credit in Alberta, socialism in Saskatchewan may 
have appeared unspectacular, even unsuccessful.  But the differences between the two 
provinces was so great as to make comparisons difficult and misleading.”22  It would be 
the CCF, not Social Credit that would be a factor in Saskatchewan politics from that 
                                                 
17 Wesley, Code Politics, 34. 
18 Thomas, Aberhart and Social Credit, 88-89. 
19 Thomas, Aberhart and Social Credit, 88. 
20 Smith, Prairie Liberalism, 240. 
21 Smith, Prairie Liberalism, 241. 
22 Smith, Prairie Liberalism, 241-242. 
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moment forth.  Indeed, in 1944, the CCF “won forty-seven of fifty-two seats and 53 per 
cent of the popular vote.  Patterson, who retained his seat by just six votes, was one of 
only five Liberals in the new legislature, while the Conservatives were once again shut 
out.”23   
 These accounts discuss the Social Credit in Saskatchewan in largely general 
terms.  Scholars of the history of the Social Credit movement tend to focus more on the 
successful Alberta and British Columbia wings of the Social Credit movement.  
Historians have also largely ignored local and regional trends across Saskatchewan, and 
how they factor into the 1938 election’s outcome.  It is especially important to look at 
areas of the province where the Social Creditors found success.  The most prominent 
example of Social Credit success was the riding of Melville, one of only two that elected 
a Social Credit candidate.  The documentation that covers the nomination process and 
subsequent election in this riding is considerably more detailed than for any other riding 
in the province.  Indeed, the records indicate a healthy, competitive nomination process 
with full vetting of the candidates.  It is also worth noting the fact that the German 
community was particularly active in politics at the time.  Other scholars have not 
previously discussed any possible Social Credit link with German farming communities.   
 In the thesis that follows, the Social Credit’s involvement in the Saskatchewan 
election of 1938 will be divided into three parts.  The first chapter will discuss the years 
leading up to the election, from 1935 to 1938.  Here, analysis will focus on the Social 
Credit victory in 1935 in Alberta and why Aberhart and the Social Creditors believed that 
success was within their grasp in Saskatchewan.  This section will also focus on 
organizational efforts on the part of Social Creditors in Saskatchewan, including the 
                                                 
23 Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History, 342. 
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political pedigrees of new party members in Saskatchewan, many of whom were from 
other parties.  The second chapter will discuss the election itself.  Key elements of this 
chapter include telling the story of a new, rather green political machine that was not 
particularly well-oiled.  In addition, infighting plays a significant role in the conduct of 
the Social Credit campaign.  Several different groups of people emerge during the course 
of the campaign claiming to be the legitimate Social Credit organization, which caused a 
rapid breakdown of party unity.  The third chapter assesses the aftermath of the election.  
Specifically, this chapter will analyze Aberhart’s decision to personally intervene in the 
campaign and suspend the organizational leadership in Saskatchewan, deploying trusted 
right hand man Ernest Manning to run the campaign.  This chapter will debate the merits 
of this decision, and discuss why this move may have played a role in Social Credit’s 
inability to find success in the province in the future.   
 This thesis will not compare and contrast Alberta and Saskatchewan but instead 
take Alberta as a starting point for Social Credit and then place it into the context of 
Saskatchewan in 1938.  The most important primary source in reconstructing the events 
before, during and after the election of 1938 are consequently the Social Credit party 
documents, available at the Provincial Archives of Alberta.  These materials are crucial to 
this work as they include party correspondence, in particular political strategy.  These 
papers reveal much about the internal struggle within many elements of Social Credit at 
the time.  As Social Credit was a relatively new political force, many of the letters 
included in this collection mention the fears between different members of the party.  
One fear in particular was that new members may or may not have been loyal to the 
Social Credit cause, and simply may have been in it for themselves.  Additionally, the 
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CCF papers, available at the Saskatchewan Archives Board, are necessary to look at the 
CCF’s position as the official opposition.  In this particularly extensive collection, a 
common theme of co-operation between progressive parties to take down the Liberals can 
be found. 
 Next, the Conservative papers, available at the University of Saskatchewan’s 
Special Collections, while less extensive, are particularly useful.  In these documents, a 
number of Conservative insiders discuss the reality, from their perspective, that a large 
percentage of Social Credit supporters were former Tories who had jumped ship to the 
Social Credit Party in an opportunistic attempt to win power.  Another reason why the 
Conservative papers play a key role is because of John Diefenbaker’s position as leader 
of the Conservative Party at the time.  It is therefore possible to glean information about 
the election that may be otherwise impossible if one only looks at the election from the 
perspective of party pamphlets and internal campaign documents.  Last but certainly not 
least, the Liberal Party papers are crucial because of the Liberal Party’s status as the 
governing party.  Throughout this set of records, Liberal politicians seem largely 
unconcerned about the possible impact of progressive opposition parties on their hold on 
power. 
 The Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan, largely running on the same 
policies as the Alberta branch of the Social Credit movement, is an integral element in 
understanding the political culture in Saskatchewan and the nature of prairie populist 
political movements during the 1930s.  It must be stressed that this research is important 
to understanding the nature of the political culture of both Alberta and Saskatchewan.  
One might have expected the Social Credit movement to have appeal in Saskatchewan 
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because it had success in Alberta, but it did not turn out that way.  This thesis will 
determine if this incident supports the idea that the politics of these two provinces are 
really fundamentally different despite the fact that the provinces were created in 1905 and 
both governed by Liberal governments for much of the first few years. 
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Chapter One 
Social Credit before the election: A Study in Political Infighting 
 
 In the years preceding the Saskatchewan general election of 1938, many unique 
political developments were occurring on the prairies.  Saskatchewan, like the rest of the 
developed world, was well into the Great Depression, with little to no end in sight.  The 
people had given both the Conservatives and the Liberals opportunity to form 
government in separate elections in 1929 and 1934, respectively, and both had largely 
failed to provide comprehensive relief.  As a result, many people believed in the lead-up 
to the election of 1938 that it was now time to look at other options for political 
leadership.  The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), a socialist, grass-roots 
organization, had a new leader in George Williams who wished to have his party place 
“greater emphasis on a planned economy”.1  This movement of agrarian socialism had 
been around for some time, and was a real option for thousands of Saskatchewanians.   
 Others wished to return the Conservatives to power.  They had a new leader in 
young John Diefenbaker, a lawyer from Prince Albert.  However, the newest and for 
many the most appealing option was William Aberhart’s Social Credit Party.  Aberhart, a 
gifted orator well known for his ‘Back to the Bible’ radio broadcasts in Alberta, swept to 
power in the Alberta general election of 1935 and inspired many people in Saskatchewan 
who looked to his leadership and policies as a way out of the Great Depression.  His 
Social Credit movement became an example, along with the CCF, of a western populist 
movement, focussed on new economic solutions to the Depression.  Indeed, many 
westerners felt as though they were being left behind in confederation.  The greatest 
                                                 
1 William Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary: Fifth House, 2005), 323. 
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challenge that Aberhart faced in gaining support for his movement in Saskatchewan was 
to overcome the perception, real or imagined, that he was intent on effectively controlling 
the province from Alberta.  Fortunately for Aberhart, Saskatchewan was largely devoid 
of political leadership at this juncture of its history, with Premier William Patterson 
largely being dictated to from Ottawa by former premier Jimmy Gardiner.  As a result, it 
was necessary in the years between 1935 and 1938 to build up an organization in the 
province that could present itself as a legitimate, principled choice for government over 
the tired Liberal Party, the significantly weakened Conservative Party, and the largely 
untested CCF.  This process will be the primary focus of this chapter, concentrating on 
Social Credit’s preparations for the election. 
 Social Credit began organizing for the Saskatchewan election of 1938 shortly 
after they had found success in Alberta in 1935.  There were many people interested in 
seeing a new political alternative succeed in governing Saskatchewan where others, it 
was believed, had largely failed.  Shortly after the federal election of 1935 in which 
Social Credit elected two representatives to the House of Commons from Saskatchewan, 
E.W. Hinkson, a Regina lawyer and Social Credit organizer, wrote to William Aberhart 
on December 7, 1935 requesting his assistance.  He explained that the Saskatchewan 
branch of the Social Credit league was in debt $600 and asked if he would be able to give 
a lecture to help raise funds. 2  Aberhart responded “it is very difficult for me to suggest 
stopping off in Regina at this time as I do not know just when we will be through, and of 
course I am anxious to get back to Edmonton just as soon as possible as there are very 
                                                 
2 Provincial Archives of Alberta [hereafter PAA], Premier’s Papers, 1093, E. Hinkson to W. Aberhart, 7 
December 1935. 
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many governmental matters to deal with.”3  It was evident as early as 1935 that Aberhart 
was insistent that, at this juncture, he was quite busy with matters in Alberta and that he 
had little time to campaign for or assist the Social Credit movement in other provinces.  
Hinkson, however, was insistent that Aberhart come to Saskatchewan and assist in 
organizational matters.  He quickly wrote another letter after Aberhart’s earlier response, 
restating his opinion that Aberhart’s assistance was desperately needed and expressing, in 
his opinion, what the need for Saskatchewan was:  
The position here is that the organization that was set up for the federal 
election has disintegrated and I am left with only a very faithful few who are 
unable to assist me in meeting a large deficit.  I have already made 
arrangements to borrow enough money to meet most of the deficit on the 
understanding that this would be repaid out of the proceeds of a lecture that 
you would deliver on your return trip from Ottawa. 
 
Perhaps it was presumptuous on my part to suggest such arrangements but I 
was so certain that you would be only too glad to assist the cause of Social 
Credit here out of the predicament in which I am placed that I took the only 
course that seemed left open to me.  It’s the old story of the man grasping at a 
straw.4 
 
Clearly, Social Credit in Saskatchewan was in a difficult position.  It is curious to note 
that at this stage much of Social Credit’s support had eroded after the end of the federal 
election campaign.  Political movements rely on strong organizations, and a lack thereof 
between elections can be disastrous.  This issue would continue to prove to be a 
significant problem for the Social Credit movement. 
 Another endemic issue that would prove to become a recurrent theme was the 
prominence of several individuals wishing to organize on behalf of Social Credit with no 
mandate or official sanction to do so.  On March 27, 1937, Hinkson wrote another letter 
to Aberhart updating the premier of the situation in Saskatchewan.  He expressed concern 
                                                 
3 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to E. Hinkson, 10 December 1935. 
4 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, E. Hinkson to W. Aberhart, 13 December 1935. 
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that separate organizations that did not have the official sanction of the Social Credit 
League of Canada were operating within the province of Saskatchewan and portraying 
themselves as legitimate.  Hinkson tried to set the record straight: 
I notice by the press that Harold Crawford is in Edmonton and in order that 
you may understand that he has no connection with Social Credit in Regina I 
am writing you.  As you remember he acted as Chairman of your meeting here 
at my request and immediately thereafter he proceeded to organize a separate 
organization which he did and practically killed the Social Credit movement 
here as well as himself in the process.5 
 
Other personalities appearing in correspondence between Saskatchewan Social Credit 
organizers and Premier Aberhart’s office are portrayed as being incompetent or simply 
incapable of organizational matters.  Lorne Smith, a director of the Social Credit league, 
wrote to Aberhart on May 2, 1938 to discuss the presence of such individuals: 
As a director of the Sask. Social Credit league I am writing to you regarding 
the stand I have heard you have taken regarding the action taken by our 
executive in dismissing Mr. [Malcolm] Haver and appointing Mr. McGinnis 
as organizer and Mr. Crawford as secretary… I was one who supported Mr. 
Haver at the convention last fall but when I saw that his secretary work was a 
complete failure, that he did not have the personality to make an organizer I 
saw that I had made a mistake… As far as Mr. Crawford is concerned frankly 
I am not pleased with his appointment but he is not in a position of authority 
and there has to be some one to do the work which Mr. Haver utterly failed to 
do.6 
 
It was at this point that members of Aberhart’s cabinet began to get concerned about the 
situation in Saskatchewan.  Lucien Maynard, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, wrote in 
a letter dated May 23, 1938 to Aberhart that a man by the name of Miller had wished to 
receive the Social Credit nomination for Gravelbourg after failing to be nominated by any 
of the other parties.  Maynard suggested that Miller was “only an opportunist”.7   
                                                 
5 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, E. Hinkson to W. Aberhart, 27 March 1937. 
6 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, L. Smith to W. Aberhart, 2 May 1938. 
7 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, L. Maynard to W. Aberhart, 23 May 1938. 
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 Overall, the correspondence between the Premier’s Office and the organizers of 
the Saskatchewan Social Credit League indicate a seemingly perpetual state of chaos and 
disorganization.  Much of this trouble seems to have centred around Malcolm J. Haver.  
Acting as general secretary and organizer, Haver presented himself as a loyal and 
dedicated supporter of Social Credit in his correspondence with Premier Aberhart.  He 
wrote Aberhart on April 22, 1938 to discuss his concerns about a recent executive 
meeting of the Social Credit League, in which he felt directors had abused the powers 
entrusted to them at the most recent party convention: 
The convention minutes, stated that the central executive of five, had the 
power to add directors in constituencies that were not represented.  But in 
spite of my protests and pointing out that fact, the Vice-President, Mr. Clark, 
rose and moved that any one present be added to the directorate provided two 
of the Directors would vouch that he was an active Social Creditor.  As fast as 
they were added, the new Directors vouched for their friends.  The entire 
twenty-five [visitors] were added.  Social Credit destinies were thus entrusted 
to a faction that had been inactive as far as advancing Social Credit is 
concerned, and some of whom have even been advocating unity with other 
parties.  The President, Mr. Needham himself, had just attended another unity 
meeting in Wilkie, where he pledged support to a fusion candidate.8 
 
Naturally, the concern that some of these people were not fully committed to the Social 
Credit cause would be a serious issue for Aberhart.  The overall tone of the 
communications between Aberhart’s office and the Saskatchewan Social Creditors is 
largely one of confusion and uncertainty over who was in charge and who could be 
trusted.  The presence of men such as Needham attending meetings in which they 
expressed support for unity between Social Credit and other political organizations was 
seen as cause for concern.   
 On the other hand, others within the Social Credit League portrayed Malcolm 
Haver as a turncoat.  John Hilton, secretary of the Social Credit Party in Saskatchewan, 
                                                 
8 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, M. Haver to W. Aberhart, 22 April 1938. 
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wrote to Aberhart on May 13, 1938 to inform him that Haver had been supporting a 
Conservative candidate in the Rosthern riding.9  A summary of the Social Credit Regina 
meeting on April 9, 1938 indicates clearly that a motion was carried: “that Mr. Haver be 
removed from the office of Sec. Organizer”.10  Additionally, clause three of the summary 
stated that the executive was to be organized as follows: Joseph Needham and O.B. 
Elliot, Presidents; Fred Clarke, Vice President; H.W. Arnold, organizer; and John H. 
Hilton, secretary.11  In response to this meeting, the Saskatoon branch of the Social Credit 
League sent an inter-office communication to the provincial executive in which they 
expressed grave concern: 
We do not consider it a good policy to attempt the re organization of the 
Saskatchewan Social Credit League at this time, in view of the fact that an 
election is imminent. 
Some of the names mentioned in clause three of the memo have not been 
noticed in (action) in Social Credit circles for a number of years.   
After due consideration by a joint meeting of a number of the Provincial 
Executive and the Saskatoon Executive and Directors, that a unanimous 
motion was shown in favor of this memo be rejected.  And that the carring 
[sic] on of the Social Credit organization work be carried on by the 100% 
Social Creditors to a successful conclusion. 
Further we suggest that all proposals of cooperation with other party leaders 
be rejected, as we consider it to be detrimental to the best interests of Social 
Credit, and the advancements.12 
 
Serious splits within the party’s organizations were becoming more pronounced at this 
point.  Premier Aberhart, however, had been largely absent from dealing with the 
difficulties that had arisen.  Eventually, he wrote Lorne Smith about the problems with 
the Saskatchewan organization:  
                                                 
9 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, J. Hilton to W. Aberhart, 13 May 1938. 
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I am of the opinion that it is in the interests of all concerned to settle 
difficulties that arise by amicable discussion.  Any decisions regarding 
activities of your organization would have to be based on a knowledge of its 
Constitution, and the full details of the situation.  I do not consider that I 
would be in a position to advise in the present circumstances.  The success of 
any organization depends upon hard work by men of integrity and ability.  
The only suggestion I can make from this distance is that those who are 
interested in the success of your movement in the best possible hands, and 
support the Executive Constitution… As I say above, however, it would be 
exceedingly difficult to form a clear picture of the situation from this 
distance.13 
 
Even by this date, Aberhart remained unwilling to intervene in the affairs of the 
Saskatchewan branch of the Social Credit movement.  Most of the provincial 
organization remained divided and in chaos, with members uncertain who was truly with 
Social Credit and who could be trusted. 
 Social Credit was able to organize effectively in only a few ridings.  Maynard 
wrote to Aberhart that “I believe Melville has the best organization up to date.  We have 
two or three people in Melville who are looking after this zone and they have done 
marvellous work.”14  Constituency members put a considerable amount of thought and 
work into the process to nominate a suitable candidate for the upcoming election.  The 
primary piece of evidence suggesting that Melville was well-organized is a report of the 
Advisory Board of the Social Credit Melville constituency, which includes the results of 
a vote between the five candidates who put their name forward for consideration, drawing 
133 total ballots.  Mr. F. Herman was elected with 86 of the first-choice ballots.15  
Included in this report were the dossiers of all five candidates for the Social Credit 
nomination.  These dossiers were extensive in the recording of the various candidates’ 
family, political, and work history.  Part of Herman’s dossier, for example, listed him as 
                                                 
13 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to L. Smith, 1 April 1938. 
14 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, L. Maynard to W. Aberhart, 23 May 1938. 
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being “Born in Ontario, German, English extraction”, and stated his political history, in 
part, as being “C.C.F. candidate Wolsely Qu’appelle in 1935, sympathetic to Social 
Credit while such”.16  This report, of course, could not be fully conclusive of an 
individual candidate’s suitability to run for the Social Credit party, but it is important to 
note that the Melville advisory board made this report.  This fact becomes especially 
critical when noting that, throughout the extensive examination of Premier Aberhart’s 
papers in preparation for writing this thesis, the Melville report is the only one to do so.  
One can only conclude that in the lead-up to the Saskatchewan election of 1938, the 
Social Credit League of Saskatchewan remained a party with significant difficulties in 
organizational skills and a considerable amount of infighting. 
 Insight into the state of the governing Liberal Party in the lead-up to the 
Saskatchewan election of 1938 can be found in the Jimmy Gardiner fonds, located in the 
Provincial Archives of Saskatchewan.  Gardiner, who had previously been premier of 
Saskatchewan, had left Saskatchewan politics in 1935 and moved into the federal cabinet, 
serving as Minister of Agriculture under Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King.  
However, he retained a considerable amount of influence over the events playing out at 
the provincial level.  Indeed, even with Gardiner busy in his federal role, he would 
remain a significant presence in Saskatchewan politics.  Political scientist David E. Smith 
writes in his book, Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71:  
The virtual duplication of the old cabinet in the new and the temperament in 
Patterson himself suggested to some observers that Gardiner’s influence 
would remain as potent as ever in provincial politics despite his absence in 
Ottawa.  Assertions to this effect became a constant theme of the CCF and 
Conservative parties in Saskatchewan for two decades, and eventually it was 
to do considerable harm to the provincial Liberals… the composition of the 
new government was part of Gardiner’s legacy, and from this past 
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experience… the former leader continued to exert his influence over events in 
Saskatchewan.17 
 
Clearly, having a sitting premier largely seen as subordinate or even taking orders from 
Ottawa cannot be overlooked as a factor in the lead-up to the election.  This fact is 
reflected in the research materials; no independent premier’s papers detailing Patterson’s 
communications exist, and historians must rely on Gardiner’s communications with 
organizers in Saskatchewan to gain some perspective of the Liberal Party in years before 
the 1938 election. 
 Discussion about preparations for the 1938 election in the provincial Liberal Party 
source material is rather limited.  It strikes one that the Liberals were not particularly 
concerned about losing the election.  Indeed, with the Conservatives still in disarray over 
the drubbing they had received at the polls in 1934 and other parties, such as the CCF, 
espousing radical views, the Liberals seemed the natural choice of voters who wanted a 
safe, trusted option.  Discussion over what party seemed a suitable ‘non-Liberal’ 
alternative was difficult to peg down, as Smith writes,  
Confusion in the CCF constituency associations became increasingly evident 
as local leaders were unsure which party or parties were progressive enough to 
be approached on the matter… potential cooperation was limited to the 
Conservatives or Social Credit.  Even then it was hard to set a firm and fast 
rule… in some respects the Conservatives were the more perplexing of the 
two alternatives.  Although they had chosen a new leader, John Diefenbaker, 
in October 1936, the party’s chances in the next provincial election were far 
from promising.18 
 
With such a complicated scene among provincial opposition parties, the Liberals 
remained the party of the establishment.  But some unorthodox coalitions were being 
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considered in a desperate attempt to remove the Liberals from power.  As Smith goes on 
to write,  
The shift in CCF attitudes towards the Tories could be explained in part by 
their desire to defeat the Liberals.  This was the interpretation the Liberals put 
upon it as they adopted the incongruous stance of the majority party underdog.  
Good partisan propaganda that it was, it did not tell the whole story.19 
 
To be sure, some Liberals were concerned about choosing good candidates for the 
election.  Generally, though, Liberal concerns in the election focussed not so much on a 
disorganized opposition but on keeping loyal party members happy.  Jimmy Gardiner’s 
influence in provincial politics remained strong, and Premier Patterson was only more 
than happy to mimic Gardiner’s government in his own.  Liberal organizers believed that, 
due to the failure of the Conservatives to bring Saskatchewan out of the Great Depression 
by 1934, the Liberal Party was the only real option for concerned citizens who were 
unwilling to trust radical alternatives with the governance of the province.  This strategy, 
as implemented by the Liberal Party, would prove to be most effective in keeping the 
Liberal Party in power in Saskatchewan. 
 Equally deserving of attention in looking at the years leading up to the 
Saskatchewan election of 1938 is the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).  
The CCF, possessing a distinctively socialist ideology, was desperate to rid 
Saskatchewan of the governing Liberals.  Unlike the Social Credit or the Conservatives, 
the CCF had never attained power anywhere in the country at this point, neither on the 
provincial or federal scene.  They, much like Social Credit, had a progressive vision for 
the province which differed considerably from the Liberal image of Saskatchewan’s 
future.  The CCF was also willing to cooperate with other progressive movements.  
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Specifically, CCF members were, at least initially, open to the idea of cooperation with 
the Social Credit Party.  From the minute book of the Executive meeting of July 14, 
1937, the following resolution was passed: 
This convention of the Sask. CCF reaffirms its belief in the wisdom and 
necessity for the cooperation between progressive and democratic groups in 
the political field.  The CCF does not ask other groups to relinquish their 
identity and join with the CCF in a fusion party nor is the CCF willing to sink 
its identity and principles in a fusion party.  The CCF believes the program as 
accepted by the Provincial Convention provides a basis on which such groups 
may cooperate.  AND BE IT RESOLVED that this convention requests the 
incoming Provincial Council to find ways and means of promoting 
cooperation between such individuals and organizations in the Province.  
Carried.20 
 
Clearly, the executive of the CCF was given a mandate to work towards removing the 
Liberals from power, while at the same time not watering down their principles.  This 
proposal was considered and accepted and appeared to be viewed as an open gesture 
towards other parties, leading to the hope that it would be reciprocated. 
 With this mandate in hand, the CCF executive proceeded to see what could be 
done regarding cooperation.  Thus, at the CCF executive meeting held on September 11, 
1937, another motion was passed regarding Social Credit and cooperation with their 
group.  A message to be presented to Social Credit was thoroughly discussed and 
approved.  It read: 
To members of the Social Credit Convention, Saskatoon, October 6, 1937.  
Through the medium of this message of greeting, the Saskatchewan 
Cooperative Commonwealth desires to extend to your organization an 
invitation to meet a committee from the Saskatchewan CCF to canvass the 
possibility of cooperation, in order to prevent the forces of reaction again 
sweeping Saskatchewan by splitting the reform vote.21 
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This message can only be read as a bold CCF attempt to try to reverse their electoral 
failures and gain ground on the Liberal party.  While having explicitly stated earlier that 
they wished to not water down their party principles, it seems as though they were willing 
to make some significant compromises in order to win over the support of other, 
potentially disparate groups of progressive forces.  In a further statement released on 
March 19, 1938, the CCF restated that it is “reasonable for the CCF people in a 
constituency in which their organization is not strong enough to reasonably expect to 
elect a progressive and reform candidate to seek to find a candidate in that constituency 
belonging to some other progressive group whom they can support without sacrificing 
any of their principles, where the CCF organization decide not to nominate.”22   
 Regardless of the optimistic view of some CCF members towards cooperation, 
other progressive groups were not particularly impressed by these overtures.  On April 1, 
1938, a representative of the CCF was sent to Edmonton, Alberta to interview Aberhart 
regarding his opinion on cooperation with the CCF in the upcoming election.  Aberhart 
was cool to the idea.  He expressed his view that the CCF had essentially blown its 
chance at forming government and winning an election.  He stated that “you fellows may 
think you can defeat that Government down there, but I am one who knows you cannot 
and to save the situation, we the Social Credit, are going into that Province to capture 
it.”23  Aberhart was also upset by the fact that, as he saw it, the CCF had done nothing to 
assist him when he was attempting to win his own election in Alberta in 1935.  
Furthermore, he denied many of the major elements of CCF policy, and stated his views 
to the interviewer: 
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I am going to frankly tell you I have no use or faith in Socialism, and if it 
were to come to a showdown and I was placed in a position that I had to make 
my choice in a constituency where I had only two choices, CCF or Liberal, I 
certainly would vote Liberal.24 
 
Despite the CCF’s great hope that cooperation could be found between themselves and 
the Social Credit movement, this statement by Aberhart clearly shut the door on 
cooperation between these two groups. 
 This prospect of non-cooperation with the Social Credit did not necessarily mean 
that there were not other ways the CCF could prepare for the upcoming election by trying 
to unite the progressive vote together.  In a letter from George Williams, provincial leader 
of the CCF, to M.J. Coldwell and T.C. Douglas, CCF members of the House of 
Commons on February 17, 1938, Williams laid out a strategy that could be used in their 
favour in the months leading up to the election.  Williams stated his belief that “it would 
very much help us here in Saskatchewan if a definite wedge could be driven between 
[Social Creditors] Needham and Haver.”25  Williams believed the best strategy to 
eliminate Social Credit as a threat would be to drive a wedge between these two men and 
take advantage of party infighting.  Williams then gave Coldwell and Douglas his 
personal suggestion on how to deal with Needham: 
If you two could talk to him quietly about the getting together of the Social 
Credit group and the CCF group in that corner of the Province… and even 
leave the impression that you would like to have him come in with the CCF 
without definitely asking him to desert his own party, I think the day would 
come when he will come in with the CCF and desert his own party.  In other 
words a little bit of tactful diplomacy with Needham just now will pay good 
dividends.26 
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Another issue that this particular letter brings up is the doubt among many CCFers that 
members of the Social Credit movement were actually all that strongly dedicated to the 
cause of Social Credit.  Divisions within Social Credit were not limited to the Battlefords.  
They were also divided in places such as Wilkie, as Williams pointed out in a letter to M. 
J. Coldwell dated February 5, 1938: 
The situation in Wilkie is in a state of flux.  The sum and total of the situation 
to date is that Social Credit has been internally weakened by bickerings [sic] 
within their own party, while we on the other hand have possibly gained some 
ground.  Whatever happens with respect to Wilkie and other things of a like 
nature in Saskatchewan, one thing we are determined to avoid is expulsions 
and internal friction.27 
 
Indeed, one thing that the CCF seemed to have going for it in the lead-up to the 1938 
election that Social Credit did not have was a stable internal party structure. 
 Other possibilities of cooperation were still being considered in the lead-up to the 
election.  The idea of cooperation with the Conservatives had been brought up by the 
CCF party executive, but in a letter dated September 13, 1937 from George Williams to J. 
H. Mayhew, secretary of the Willowbunch Constituency, Williams threw cold water on 
the idea.  He stated that “insofar as the Conservatives are concerned, you will recollect 
that the question was raised at the convention.  Although not put to a vote, the indication 
was that the convention was not favourably disposed to any cooperation with the 
Conservatives.”28  Williams’ view on cooperation with the Conservatives seemed to 
become even less enthusiastic as time went by.  In a letter dated March 15, 1938 from 
Williams to T. D. Agnew of Penton, Saskatchewan, Williams wished to reassure Agnew 
of the fact that, although the CCF candidate in Weyburn had also accepted the 
Conservative nomination, he had pledged to sit as a CCFer if elected.  Williams further 
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went on to state unequivocally that “this does not mean that we are foolish enough to 
expect reactionary Tories such as Diefenbaker to become supporters of the CCF.”29  The 
CCF was the party most willing to engage in cooperation with other opposition parties to 
defeat the governing Liberals.  However, their efforts at cooperation were largely met 
with either indifference or outright hostility, particularly from William Aberhart, who 
was especially opposed to the idea of cooperation with the CCF. 
 In the years leading up to the Saskatchewan election of 1938 the Conservative 
Party was in the political wilderness.  After its defeat in the 1934 provincial election, it 
had been struggling to find a way to remain relevant.  Especially difficult was the fact 
that the Liberals represented the party of big business, as well as those who were fearful 
of change and of radical economic policies.  This fact made the traditional role of a 
fiscally conservative party essentially obsolete for the time being as the Liberals had 
assumed the role.  However, the Conservatives under leader John Diefenbaker decided to 
go ahead and contest the election.  In a letter dated April 8, 1938, Diefenbaker wrote to 
supporter R. W. Ward of Calgary, Alberta, to thank him for a financial contribution.  In 
the letter, Diefenbaker added that “I am hopeful that the Conservatives will have about 
thirty-five candidates in the field.  The great difficulty at the moment is that Aberhart has 
announced that Social Credit intends to nominate in this province, which will tend to 
make one further division in the opposition vote.”30  Considering that the Conservatives 
planned to nominate 35 candidates in a Legislative Assembly holding 52 members, they 
must certainly have realized they had no chance of forming government.  In the minutes 
of a meeting of the northern council of the Conservative Party held December 21, 1937, 
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several party members felt they had little chance of winning seats if the opposition vote 
was split between the Conservatives, Social Credit, and CCF.  One member, a Mr. 
Swallows of North Battleford, expressed his opinion that “a three cornered fight would 
ensure election of Liberal.”31  Concerns about splitting the opposition vote, therefore, 
were not limited to the CCF.  A strong, mostly trusted Liberal government with the 
support of established business interests and a friendly government in Ottawa would be a 
challenge in any election to defeat, let alone one that faced three opposition parties. 
 Cooperation between the Conservatives and other parties, particularly the CCF, 
was considered to a degree at this point in time.  In a letter dated November 27, 1937, a 
D. G. Mclean of Wakaw, Saskatchewan wrote to Diefenbaker to express his feelings 
about the status of opposition parties and nominations for provincial ridings: 
There seems to be a regret that the C.C.Fs. nominated a man in Lumsden as 
that is counted a sure seat for us, and some of them is saying that we better get 
busy and get our men in what we think is safe seats before the C.C.Fs.  
Nominate these men, if that is the policy our party is going work on then there 
is no getting busy about it.  If we are to have an understanding with the other 
party, we had better call both the leaders of both parties togather [sic] and 
agree on certain seats.32 
 
However, problems quickly arose.  In a letter written on April 2, 1938, Frank Turnbull of 
Regina, Saskatchewan wrote to Diefenbaker explaining the difficulties that the 
Conservatives faced in being able to win any seats, even under a scheme of cooperation 
with the CCF: 
George [Williams] claims the C.C.F. are the dominant party in the Province, 
and that we should recognize that we are distinctly inferior.  He expresses the 
belief that the C.C.F. will have a clear majority in the next house and I 
presume, for that reason, does not intend to give us a clear field in very many 
seats.  He apparently figures about eight seats for us, about 12 seats that are 
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hopeless for anybody except the Government and thirty-two seats left, which 
he hopes to win.  It is hard to negotiate with a man without any balance.33 
 
Others within the party were also disappointed with the situation regarding cooperation, 
but it was not one easily resolved.  E.E. Perley, Member of Parliament for Qu’Appelle, 
wrote Diefenbaker on April 4, 1938 to relay information on discussions he had held with 
fellow Members of Parliament from the CCF, Major Coldwell and T.C. Douglas: 
In conclusion I can only say, that Douglas and Coldwell both stated to me last 
night that they would go to Regina and lay down the law to Williams as they 
both stated the arrangement must be fair and reasonable to both parties.  I 
pointed out that if it wasn’t it would be too bad for Williams and the C.C.F.  
Even if they had a larger group than the Conservatives, they would be in a 
difficult position if the Conservatives were sore, feeling they had not had a 
square deal in the distribution of seats and therefore, were in the third 
position.  They recognize this is a fact.34 
 
George Williams clearly saw a weakened Conservative Party entering the 1938 election 
and did not want to give any concessions to help them win seats.  It is easy to understand 
Williams’ perspective.  When a political organization was as weak as the Conservatives 
going into the election, it would be difficult not to exploit.  Perley could only do so much 
to convince his fellow Members of Parliament from the CCF to support discussions 
between the Conservatives and CCF on cooperation.  Ultimately, however, the two 
parties were both separate organizations with different viewpoints on how governance 
should be undertaken, and these difficulties were not easily overcome. 
 Some criticism was also levelled at the abilities of Diefenbaker as leader of the 
Conservatives.  On March 16, 1939, John M. Robb, Dominion Organizer of the national 
Conservative Party, wrote Diefenbaker to explain that “while in Saskatchewan I heard 
several criticisms of your leadership.  At the same time I have heard many commendable 
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things said also.  This of course is to be expected especially when a leader has not been 
successful.”35  While this letter was written after the election, it nevertheless underscores 
the fact that Diefenbaker struggled to find success early on in his political career.  This 
unfortunate situation was not Diefenbaker’s fault.  In a letter dated May 26, 1939, A. 
Kimball of Regina, Saskatchewan wrote to Diefenbaker to express his feelings that “since 
the last federal election (1935) the Conservatives have done little but observe the tide of 
passing events.”36  Kimball went on to state how there was a pure absence of concerned 
individuals within the Conservative Party: 
Leaving yourself out of the picture for the moment, what man of former 
prominence in the party is or has taken the slightest interest in party affairs 
since the Federal election and why is this?  If a caucus of party leaders was 
called tomorrow how many former provincial ministers, federal ministers, 
members of Parliament or senators would be sufficiently interested to attend?  
Not a Corporal’s Guard!  Again I ask you why is this?  I venture the statement 
that in ninety percent of the provincial constituencies there is not the 
semblance of an active organization existing.  In fact it is worse if possible 
than in 1926 when Dr. Anderson re-organized the province.  Again I ask 
why?37 
 
Kimball blamed the party’s poor standing in Saskatchewan on its time in office during 
the Depression38  Divided, the Conservative Party stood little chance of mounting a 
serious effort in the election of 1938. 
 In the years leading up to the Saskatchewan election of 1938, all three main 
opposition parties faced significant challenges.  For the Social Credit Party, the primary 
challenge was in getting the movement off the ground.  Several party members wished to 
assume positions of authority, often in conflict with others in the party.  Premier William 
Aberhart of Alberta was hesitant to intervene in the affairs of the party in Saskatchewan, 
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frequently citing his own business in Alberta and a desire to see the Saskatchewan wing 
find strong leadership of its own.  The CCF, meanwhile, was not plagued by the problem 
of leadership, and had a good understanding of the political scene in Saskatchewan.  
However, their efforts to cooperate with other opposition parties in an effort to unseat the 
Liberals were largely unsuccessful due to competing visions and an unwillingness to 
compromise key party policy planks.  Finally, the Conservatives were in the worse shape 
of all.  They had little organization, few actively engaged individuals, and difficulty 
finding natural allies to cooperate with. 
 On the other hand, the Liberals went into the 1938 election in a strong position.  
They were seen as a trusted, if somewhat flawed, government, and if nothing else, could 
be viewed as a steady hand to help Saskatchewan weather the Depression.  They also had 
the support of a strong federal Liberal government, with the ability to dole out patronage 
to loyal party supporters.  They did have some challenges but were generally in the 
strongest position, especially as the sitting government. 
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Chapter Two 
The Election: Chaos and Confusion 
 
 The Saskatchewan election of 1938 largely caught the Social Credit movement 
off-guard.  The legislative assembly was dissolved and the election scheduled for June 8, 
1938, almost four years from the date of the previous election.  However, this election 
call was widely viewed as a ‘snap election’, with one newspaper describing Premier 
Patterson’s election call as a “sudden announcement”.1  Social Credit had a significant 
amount of difficulty getting organized because a number of prominent organizers within 
the party fought among each other and questioned one another’s loyalty to the movement.  
The beginning of the election campaign consequently saw Social Credit largely 
unprepared, and they were forced to speed up organizational work in order to mount a 
successful campaign to capture the province.  As infighting within the party in 
Saskatchewan was such a distraction, it seemed as though there would be only one way to 
rectify the situation: call in outside help.  Alberta Premier William Aberhart, previously 
reluctant to interfere with the affairs of the Social Credit movement in other provinces, 
now felt pressure to intervene to keep the movement strong and hopefully capture a 
second province for Social Credit in the process.  Aberhart had told party organizers in 
Saskatchewan time and again that he was unwilling to get involved in the affairs of 
another province, mainly citing the reason of being too busy taking care of the concerns 
of being premier of Alberta.  But action was now required, and action would need to be 
taken. 
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 The Edmonton Bulletin reported on the situation of the Saskatchewan election as 
it stood on May 16, 1938.  The news ran on the newspaper’s front page, as “Socred 
Nominations Rushed: Vote Date Set.”2  The article, which included a significant number 
of Aberhart’s comments, focussed on the meaning of the call of the election and detailed 
plans for how Social Credit would fight the election.  Aberhart had much to complain 
about Premier Patterson’s decision to call an election: 
Premier Patterson’s rush in holding the election on June 8, is in accord with his 
statement last week, ‘if we hold the election at once the people will put the 
Liberals in again.  If we defer a few weeks, no one can tell what may happen’.  
Evidently the Liberals decided to take no chances.  On account of the suddenness 
of the election and the short time allowed to give the people a chance to think this 
whole matter through, our meetings as announced last Sunday will need to take 
the form of conventions. 3 
 
In preparation for nomination meetings, Aberhart had written a letter several days earlier 
on May 12, 1938 to T. A. McInnis, an organizer for Social Credit from Regina, 
discussing how Social Credit was “zoning the province and appointing key men of 
supervisors over each zone.  We are accepting the nominations of the people who know 
the men there.”4  Unless Social Credit had been able to successfully organize the entire 
province, appoint supervisors, and accept nominations within the four-day period 
between Aberhart’s letter to McInnis and the election call as reported in the Edmonton 
Bulletin article of May 16, 1938, Social Credit was, organizationally speaking, in a very 
tight bind.   
 John Hilton, secretary of the Social Credit Party in Saskatchewan, was just one 
example of a man concerned about the situation of Social Credit in the days immediately 
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before the election call.  On May 5, 1938, he wrote to Aberhart to express his concerns 
personally.  Hilton pressed the issue that organizational work needed to proceed as 
quickly as possible.  He was also frustrated at the lack of a response from the Alberta 
government about what to do: “I have had no answers to the letters I have written you 
this week but I continue to be the butt for considerable interrogation.  Here is almost 
another week passed and no action.”5  At this point, nobody seemed to have any positive 
things to say about Malcolm Haver, the Social Credit organizer discussed in the first 
chapter.  His actions suggested that he was, in fact, never a real Social Creditor.  
Naturally, when a political movement has organizers who are not dedicated to the cause, 
it will be difficult to organize properly.   
 Hilton continued to press forward his concern that little was being done in 
anticipation of the election call.  He proceeded to make his opinion known that if no 
response was given to him quickly, he and the executive would move forward 
immediately to do “REAL work FORTH-WITH”.6  Hilton went on to explain his 
perspective to Aberhart:  
You need the endorsation of Sask for your own benefit & pussy-footing will 
never get it for you.  We have a real man in Arnold, ready to ‘go places’ and 
equipped to go.  Why monkey around with discredited weaklings?  Liberals have 
arranged all their conventions except one in the Prov. showing they are ready on 
the word to go.  We have it all to do…  Quickest way to get the zones is by air… 
Let’s hear from you at once.7 
 
Aberhart was quick to reply with a letter dated May 9, 1938 with his own perspective on 
the ever-deteriorating situation in Saskatchewan.  He was not particularly pleased with 
Hilton’s comments: 
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I am quite surprised at the statements you make in your letter.  You are apparently 
an impossible man.  We accepted your invitation when you were here and made 
arrangements with your men regarding how to proceed.  I am afraid you have 
your eyes too much on Haver.  If Mr. Elliott gave Colonel Arnold [Saskatchewan 
Social Credit organizers] his complete authority to proceed to organize the 
province after our meeting and you are ready to endorse this authority also at this 
time, then I quite understand that you both are not in harmony with the Social 
Credit movement there.  I hope Colonel Arnold will not assume authority.  If he 
does he will be double-crossing us in the arrangements we have already made.8 
 
Aberhart remained displeased with the confusing situation as it existed between the 
different men in charge of organizing the province.   
 Hilton, however, was right about the need to move quickly in organizing the 
province.  Later on in Aberhart’s letter to Hilton, Aberhart discussed his views regarding 
what the way ahead should be: 
May I suggest to you that the holding of conventions and the nominating of 
candidates is not of the greatest importance at the present moment.  I feel that 
both you and Mr. Arnold should abide by your agreement when you were here or 
you need not call our attention to anybody else.  I trust that this letter will be 
understood and that you will meet with Mr. Manning [Ernest Manning, a 
prominent cabinet minister in the Aberhart government] who will be in Saskatoon 
on the 11th to discuss further the whole program.9 
 
Aberhart did not seem to be worried about the pending election.  Ernest Manning, 
Aberhart’s right-hand man in Alberta and a future premier himself, was scheduled to 
travel to Saskatchewan to discuss the preparations for the election, and that all would be 
resolved.  By this point, though, it would appear that Aberhart was of the opinion that the 
Saskatchewan organization could not be relied upon to do anything in the lead-up to the 
election and that outside intervention would be necessary.  Saskatchewan Social Credit 
organizers came to the same realization.  Organizer T.A. McInnis wrote Aberhart: 
After giving due reflection to the events of the past ten days, I have come to the 
conclusion that it is not the wish of those in charge of the campaign that I have 
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any active part in that campaign, and I shall act in accordance with that belief.  I 
shall still be an ardent supporter of Social Credit, and will do nothing at any time 
that will in any way hinder the progress of the movement… if at any time, I can 
be of any service to any candidate standing on behalf of Social Credit, I will be 
happy to assist, and in the meantime, I will stand on the sidelines and do my best 
to cheer you on.10 
 
McInnis also took the opportunity to inform Aberhart that he was forwarding to the 
Alberta premier’s office all letters he had received from supporters wishing to participate 
in the campaign.  Five such letters were enclosed to Aberhart.  Aberhart, when 
responding to McInnis, wrote that “I have nothing against you, Mr. McInnis.  It was 
unfortunate that the Social Credit situation in Saskatchewan had become so tense.  I 
appreciate your spirit, and hope you may help in whatever way is best.”11  With the men 
in Saskatchewan still largely confused about who was doing what, who was a true Social 
Creditor and who was a turncoat, and general confusion overall, Aberhart assumed full 
responsibility for the campaign in Saskatchewan.  McInnis had signalled that this was 
indeed the case when replying to a Social Credit supporter: 
I wish to inform you that I am forwarding your letter to Premier Aberhart, as the 
direction of the Social Credit campaign in Saskatchewan is under the Western 
Social Credit Board, and I am, therefore unable to give you any information on 
that matter.  I believe, however, that if you will continue your organization of 
local groups, that you will receive assistance and direction from the proper 
authority in due course.12 
 
Clearly, the Social Credit organization as a whole believed that the Saskatchewan 
organization was unable to effectively carry out a campaign of its own, and as a result, 
assumed authority itself. 
 One important aspect of the Social Credit campaign in Saskatchewan, as directed 
by Aberhart, was the exporting of prominent Social Credit MLAs, cabinet ministers and 
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organizers from Alberta to Saskatchewan to serve as speakers on whirlwind tours of 
Saskatchewan.  The Edmonton Bulletin continued its coverage of the election call by 
reporting on these meetings.  Locations for meetings included Lloydminster, Maidstone, 
North Battleford, Prince Albert, Tisdale, Swift Current, Macklin, Unity, Kerrobert, and 
Kindersley.  Speakers included Ernest Manning, Solon E. Low [Alberta provincial 
treasurer] and Lucien Maynard [Alberta Minister of Municipal Affairs], in addition to 
Aberhart himself.13  Aberhart also issued a call for more speakers to step forward: 
Owing to the premature date announced for the Saskatchewan election, there is an 
urgent demand for speakers from Alberta.  Will any Social Credit M.L.A.’s who 
are prepared to hold meetings in Saskatchewan please notify Mr. E. C. Manning, 
chief organizer of the Western Social Credit Association, at the earliest possible 
date, stating where and for how long they are prepared, also any Saskatchewan 
districts in which you have contacts.  Also give the names of any qualified 
speakers in your constituency who are prepared to go.  Don’t delay.  Your 
assistance is needed.  We trust that the people will turn out in large numbers as we 
bring you a message of cheer and hope.14 
 
With the local organization in disarray, Aberhart stepped in and used the same tactic that 
had proven successful before: bombard the people with the message of ‘cheer and hope’.  
Aberhart wished to portray Social Credit as a force for good in coming to Saskatchewan.  
He told the residents of Saskatchewan that Social Credit would be able to help the 
province out of the Great Depression.  He spoke at length about what Social Credit could 
and would do for the people of Saskatchewan, highlighting what his government had 
done in Alberta: 
The Premier declared that “from many centres of Alberta comes the good news 
that our people are beginning to realize that we are working steadily toward 
freedom in security.  We are determined to provide security in contented homes 
with a sufficiency of purchasing power.  We are fighting for economic freedom 
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that will enable our people to develop their individual enterprise and enjoy the 
culture of their individual aptitudes and particular tendencies.15   
 
Aberhart made the same offer to Saskatchewan.  He believed that Social Credit could be 
a real alternative for Saskatchewan. 
 Many Social Creditors throughout Saskatchewan shared this view.  Andrew 
Witwicki, the President of the Western Social Credit Group of Canora, was one of these 
individuals.  In a letter written by Witwicki to Aberhart on June 2, 1938, Witwicki 
expressed his disappointment that Social Credit had been unable to nominate a candidate 
in his riding.  It was an example of how Social Credit was not well prepared for the 
election.  Witwicki explained: “as our riding was scheduled at very last for introduction 
of Social Credit thru meetings, unfortunately there had not been sufficient time to 
successfully cover the constituency before election date, however we are still confident it 
could had been done to our victory.”16  Because of the rushed nomination process, Social 
Credit had not been able to nominate a full slate of candidates.  However, supporters such 
as Witwicki remained hopeful and wished to proceed with organizational work and 
support the Social Credit movement as a whole: 
We have formed a Social Credit group here and have our secretary communicate 
with the Social Credit secretary Mr. Baker of Edmonton for full particulars as to 
establishing Social Credit group officially.   
Although I had not been nominated in this riding, I am behind the principles of 
Social Credit and will remain so in future and do all in my power to assist at 
present Yorkton riding to reach and carry the Social Credit banner on June the 8th, 
and wishing without and doubt of hope for out Triumphant Victory for the 
Province of Saskatchewan.17 
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Even though Social Credit had been unable to nominate a candidate in every riding, 
Wiwicki’s comments show that the movement had not lost some of its devoted followers. 
But capturing government would be difficult without a full slate of candidates.  While 
being supportive, there was only so much Witwicki and other Social Creditors could do 
without every riding having a candidate nominated. 
 The Melville area was a microcosm of Social Credit difficulties in Saskatchewan.   
R. Dempster, a zone supervisor based in Melville, had enjoyed some success in 
organizing parts of the east central Saskatchewan region, including the Touchwood 
constituency.  In a report from Dempster to the Members of the Advisory Board in 
Edmonton dated May 28, 1938, Dempster provided a detailed report of the nomination 
convention May 27: 
The constituency had been divided into nine zones according to geographical and 
population differences.  Zone captains were placed in charge.  In the short space 
of five days forty eight bonafide delegates representing a group each were present 
at the convention.  Organization work is going on stronger than ever at the present 
time. 18 
 
However, his report also indicated that Social Credit support was limited and that it might 
be difficult to elect a member of the Legislative Assembly: 
In addition to the delegates there were fifty one registered visitors.  A tone of 
harmony was evident throughout the convention for the furtherance of Social 
Credit.  The selection of an advisory committee was difficult owing to the fact 
that the majority of delegates present were representative of only three zones… 
we feel a Social Credit victory is quite feasible and are confident of good 
results.19 
 
Even though Social Credit had some support, it would be difficult with the lack of 
organization on the ground to obtain enough support across the province to elect a 
sufficient number of candidates to form government.   
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 Lucien Maynard, Aberhart’s Minister of Municipal Affairs, in a letter written to 
Aberhart on May 23, 1938, provided additional perspective on the situation in east-
central Saskatchewan.  He expressed his opinion that “in connection with Touchwood 
constituency, it is all zoned up and pretty well organized.  With a speaker in this 
constituency to do the educational work we stand a good chance of electing our 
candidate.”20  Melville, on the other hand, faced a strong Liberal presence.  Maynard 
relayed to Aberhart some of the concerns of this particular constituency’s organizers: 
They are exceedingly anxious however that you should speak in Melville on June 
7th, the night before the election.  The reason for this date particularly is because 
Jimmy Gardiner [federal Minister of Agriculture] and Charlie Dunn, present 
minister of Public Works in Saskatchewan will both be speaking at Melville in the 
Town Hall and the Social Creditors have made arrangements to rent the skating 
rink for your meeting.  I can assure you, judging by the crowd of between 1400 
and 1500 people that attended my meeting last Saturday, you should have no 
difficulty in securing a crowd of several thousand in this large center, leaving 
Gardiner and Dunn with a few hundred people.  The prestige that you will acquire 
by the comparison in crowds will be sufficient to swing to our side many of those 
who will still be wavering on the night of the 7th and that Gardiner is likely to 
swing his way if you are not there.21 
 
Certainly, Social Credit in Saskatchewan had a significant amount of support from 
speakers in Alberta.  But the election would decide whether the people of Saskatchewan 
were receptive of the message that Social Credit was expressing, and wanted something 
different. 
 Further expressions of disappointment in the rushed nomination process were 
articulated by others.  Robert K. Michael, a Social Credit supporter living in Edmonton, 
passed on his “regret that there are ‘a few’ constituencies [in Saskatchewan] in which 
Social Credit candidates might not be entered.”22  His wish, naturally, was that Social 
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Credit would be able to nominate a full slate of candidates for Saskatchewan.  Michael 
even made an offer to fill at least one of those constituencies without a nominee: 
If, therefore, there are some constituencies which for any reason your Association 
feels are ‘hopeless’, if you will arrange my nomination in any one of them and 
other nominations in the remainder and put me in charge of them, I would be very 
pleased to show what can be done in exactly one weeks time by my own very 
especial methods of campaigning.23 
 
Michael brings up an interesting point.  With the difficulty in finding candidates to fill 
empty nominations, Michael, a resident of Edmonton, volunteered to fill a riding despite 
the fact that he did not even live in Saskatchewan.  At this juncture, the local appeal of 
Social Credit in Saskatchewan is questionable.  Was the  promotion of Social Credit in 
Saskatchewan by Premier Aberhart of Alberta motivated by a legitimate desire to effect 
positive, long-lasting political change, or was it an invasion, motivated by a desire by 
Aberhart to control as much of the political realm of western politics as possible?  If 
Aberhart was so willing and eager to mobilize as much of his political machinery in 
Alberta as possible to move into Saskatchewan, how would voters really know the 
difference? 
 The answer lies in the reaction by other parties to the Social Credit incursion into 
Saskatchewan in the election.  The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), 
another self-styled populist movement, viewed the Social Credit move into Saskatchewan 
in a particularly negative light.  At the same time, though, in the Daily Bulletin from the 
Central Office released on May 23, 1938, the party was happy to see that the governing 
Liberals bore the brunt of the Social Credit threat: 
It is eminently satisfactory to us to see the Liberals in the position of having to do 
most of the fighting.  They are responsible for Social Credit being here.  Aside 
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from local situations, we have nothing to gain by fighting them.  According to all 
press reports, Alberta speakers are, so far, not attacking our policies.24 
 
The CCF, naturally, viewed the Liberal record as the main reason why Social Credit, and 
indeed the CCF itself, were trying their best to unseat them.  However, it was unfortunate 
that they had been unable to strike some form of substantive agreement with the Social 
Creditors before the election to prevent a division of the populist vote.  Media coverage 
would prove to be a special problem, since coverage of the Social Credit message took 
attention away from the CCF.  In the Daily Bulletin released two days later, on May 25, 
the Central Office expressed disappointment that “Aberhart monopolizes news value.  All 
dailies are jammed with news of his meetings.  It is a help in drawing opposition fire 
from us.  It is a danger in this way, that it monopolizes the public interest.  People are not 
given time to weigh over issues”25  The Central Office was also concerned that voters 
might not differentiate between the two parties.  On one hand, Aberhart did not actively 
oppose the CCF at this point in the campaign.  On the other hand, little attention was 
given to other opposition parties.  Additionally, comparisons between Social Credit and 
the CCF, as both progressive parties, could be easily made.  The Daily Bulletin stated that 
the “Liberals are attacking ‘The Something For Nothing Principles’ [principles of Social 
Credit] and link us indirectly with Social Credit on that score.”26  The danger at this 
juncture was dividing the progressive vote and thereby undermining the CCF’s message 
and how it was different from Social Credit. 
  As the campaign continued, it became increasingly obvious that Social Credit 
and the CCF were making each other’s situation more difficult.  In a letter to George 
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Williams, leader of the CCF in Saskatchewan, A. J. Mercer of Piapot, Saskatchewan, 
secretary of the executive committee of his riding, expressed his view that, in his 
constituency, it appeared as though the election was “going to be a three-cornered fight.  
The Liberals will probably be the party to beat, but Social Credit is going to be a threat.  
The other night Solon Lowe [Alberta provincial treasurer] got things started for them at 
Maple Creek and it appears that these Social Creditors are going to put on a strenuous 
campaign.”27  Mercer was clearly concerned about the threat that Social Credit was going 
to be in the campaign.  Indeed, this sentiment was not localized to individual 
constituencies and organizers, but the entire party as a whole.  In a Daily Bulletin 
released later in the campaign, the CCF Central Office explained the situation on the 
ground: 
It looks as if Aberhart has definitely declared war on us.  Note the fact that he 
leaves Patterson, Parker and Dunn unopposed.  Many of the candidates will 
probably run into difficulties locating their constituencies by June 1st.  Take the 
case of Yorkton, Wadena, Hanley, Milestone, Qu’Appelle-Wolseley, Estevan, 
Arm River, etc.  We can see Aberhart in action, with name tickets in two 
containers, drawing the candidate’s names with the left hand while he drew 
simultaneously the constituency names with his right.  They will poll a 
considerable block of the aggregate vote.  But we cannot see where they will elect 
more than two or three candidates.28 
 
 CCF headquarters saw a genuine shift in the electoral playing field from a simple Social 
Credit incursion into Saskatchewan to a dangerous threat to the CCF’s chances of 
winning the election.  The Central Office observed that Aberhart was now largely 
attacking the CCF instead of focussing on the Liberal government.  The progressive vote 
was only further divided by these attacks.  Additionally, the CCF Central Office noted 
how Aberhart was choosing candidates to stand for election in an effort to achieve a full 
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slate of candidates.  Perhaps the CCF’s portrayal of Aberhart selecting names out of two 
hats for candidates to run in constituencies was slightly exaggerated, but there was 
certainly evidence that so-called ‘parachute’ candidates were utilized by Social Credit.  
One only need to note the letter from Robert Michael to Aberhart where Michael offered 
his name up for nomination in a seat that Aberhart and the Social Credit viewed as a 
hopeless cause in order to achieve a full slate of candidates.  Additionally, this process 
also confirmed the disorganization within the Social Credit immediately leading up to the 
election.  How could a political organization expect to achieve success in an election if it 
could not get sufficiently organized and nominate candidates? 
 The Liberal Party, meanwhile, had little to say about Social Credit.  It seemed to 
be largely unconcerned about the threat that Social Credit posed towards their chances at 
re-election.  A.N. Mitchell, Vice President and General Manager of The Canada Life 
Assurance Company of Toronto, wrote to Jimmy Gardiner, the federal Minister of 
Agriculture and a former Premier of Saskatchewan, on May 23, 1938 about the Social 
Credit campaign tactics and how the Liberals should respond: 
In reading a report of a couple of Aberhart’s speeches it sounds to me as if he 
were taking the attitude that the new Alberta Acts were going to be disallowed 
anyway and as if he were basing his argument on the fact that they are going to be 
disallowed.  For instance, at Saskatoon his point apparently is that refusal by the 
Dominion Government to allow a Social Credit experiment in Alberta will result 
in a general movement all over Canada in order to permit the attempt.  In this he 
would seem to be acknowledging that the Dominion Government will not permit 
these Acts to stand and to be making his appeal based on that.29 
 
These Alberta Acts, of course, were the ones that would have implemented Social Credit 
monetary policies.  Disallowance is a reserve power which the federal government held at 
the time, whereas the federal cabinet could issue an order to the provincial lieutenant-
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governor to refuse to sign an act of a provincial legislature.  Aberhart’s argument was a 
potentially strong one to make: if his policies and attempts at monetary reform were not 
allowed to proceed by the federal government, he could insist that the federal Liberal 
party and the eastern banking establishment did not want to free the western provinces 
from the shackles of the Great Depression.  However, Mitchell believed that the Liberal 
party could use this argument during the election to their benefit.  Mitchell, himself a 
member of the so-called eastern banking establishment, suggested: 
If this [Aberhart’s argument] is so it would seem to me that nothing is being 
gained by withholding disallowance until after the election and any advantage that 
may come through granting an early disallowance is lost.  If my latest information 
from Regina is correct, there are certainly a great number in the Liberal fold there 
that think disallowance at the present moment would help the election situation.  
These would be naturally disappointed if it does not happen.  Those that feel that 
disallowance before the election might injure our prospects seem to be rather 
offset by Aberhart already arguing from the standpoint of probably 
disallowance.30 
 
Mitchell did not seem to be too concerned about the prospect of a Social Credit victory in 
Saskatchewan.  Indeed, the Liberal party as a whole seemed to have had little concern 
about the electoral prospects of Social Credit based on the available Liberal party 
documents. 
 The Conservative Party, by contrast, was worried about the Social Credit 
participation in the election.  Alex H. Reed, A Conservative supporter and lawyer from 
Turtleford, Saskatchewan, wrote to provincial Conservative leader John Diefenbaker on 
April 5, 1938, to express his concerns about their people, their policies and their 
campaign: 
Lord man, I am afraid of those Social Creditors.  They are, especially in this 
Province, a worthless lot of adventurers, but owing to the latest mistakes of 
Jimmie Gardiner, they are on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm and boldness 
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since the Edmonton victory.  I have them killed here.  They were disorganized 
and under cover.  Their Mr. Mathe at North Battleford and Mr Haver at 
Saskatoon, to say nothing of the adventurer Col. Arnold were unable to get a 
meeting together.  But since Edmonton, the woods [sic] is full of them and they 
are as smug and complacent as a Free Methodist at a Camp meeting.  They go 
about quoting the bible and Prophet Aberhart on every occasion.  AND YOU 
CANNOT ARGUE WITH THRM [sic].  They shut you up by saying the people 
[sic] of Alberta should know and look what they have done.31 
 
Reed’s letter suggests that several people in the Social Credit organization were not 
regarded by Conservatives as true believers of Social Credit but merely Social Creditors 
in name only, trying to gain power at all costs.  Indeed, from Reed’s perspective, the 
Social Credit was muddying Saskatchewan’s electoral waters and stood to benefit: 
The whole situation is most discouraging.  The C.C.F. are so arrogant and wild in 
their demands for Socialism, yea for Communism that they are not quite 
responsible.  The Grits have been so intent on dividing the forces against them 
that these forces have got out of hand and they are now reaping the whirl-wind 
(and crushing us at the same time).  The irresponsible political adventurers whose 
very lack of respectability has heretofore kept them down, are now rising on the 
ashes of the defunct Liberal Machine and threaten to swamp the Province in a 
deluge of wild, uncontrolled political fury.32 
 
A discouraging situation existing in Saskatchewan would be understating the prospects 
that the Conservatives were facing.   
 Social Credit had far more political momentum than the Conservatives did.  H.B. 
Hall, a Conservative supporter from Lloydminster, Saskatchewan, wrote to Diefenbaker 
on May 19, 1938 to report on a campaign appearance by Aberhart.  Hall described a 
meeting at which people were eager to see Aberhart and learn what he and his movement 
were all about: 
Premier Aberhart visited this town last Monday.  The Crowd that came to hear 
him was tremendous. The Theatre which has Seating capacity for 750 was jamed 
[sic] and there seemed to be near as many more outside on the sidewalk – a loud 
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speaker having been provided.  At the close of his speech, Aberhart asked all 
those that felt they could support the Social Credit idea 100% to stay to consider 
matters of organization.33 
 
Hall’s letter is yet one more indication of the amount of attention that Aberhart was able 
to generate in bringing the Social Credit movement to Saskatchewan.  The crowd was 
clearly interested in what Aberhart had to say.  Hall also provided another example of 
how the Saskatchewan Social Credit movement selected candidates for the election: 
About half the audience stayed.  Among other things, Aberhart asked the meeting 
to nominate two names as possible candidates.  (two were named and they were 
both the most unsuitable that could have been selected.) 
The two names were to be grouped with two others to be named at the 
Nomination convention at Maidstone on the morrow – Tuesday afternoon, and 
that out of those four names he – Aberhart and two of his ministers – who were 
with him – would pick the Candidate to contest the riding.  Further, that if none of 
the names so submitted were thought suitable, he would select some one else.34 
 
Hall’s remarks show that Aberhart’s candidate selection process was not limited to the 
observations that the CCF had made.  Candidate selection could be arbitrary, and this 
process was not limited to any one part of the province.  Hall took issue with the 
candidate selection process: 
In this way the people would not have the choice at all.  The people would be 
utterly ignored.  Aberhart makes the final choice himself – some one to suit his 
own purposes.  Since then I have heard, through numerous sources, that who ever 
is selected, must sign papers and declare himself willing to obey, without 
question, the dictates of the chief – Aberhart – in everything.  In this way the 
candidate has not freedom of thought or action.  He might as well be in the 
garbage heap.  Aberhart would be – as I guess he is now – an absolute dictator.35 
 
Hall went on to warn to Diefenbaker that “if the Social Credit party is successful in 
winning the election, that we shall be under the heel of an absolute dictator, just like a 
                                                 
33 USSC, Diefenbaker Papers, 43.3, H. Hall to J. Diefenbaker, 19 May 1938. 
34 USSC, Diefenbaker Papers, 43.3, H. Hall to J. Diefenbaker, 19 May 1938. 
35 USSC, Diefenbaker Papers, 43.3, H. Hall to J. Diefenbaker, 19 May 1938. 
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Hitler or Mussolini”.36  Indeed, Aberhart’s tactics, in hindsight, do resemble dictatorial 
rule.  Certainly, that was Hall’s opinion.  In addition, Hall believed that Aberhart did a 
poor job in explaining what Social Credit was all about.  He wrote that he “had the 
opportunity of being close to the platform and could hear everything Aberhart said.  He 
admits they are not telling all of what it is or means, and that the people must take the 
idea on trust.  Same way as we take a Motor car.  We use a car but the ordinary man 
knows little about it and what are the different functions of the various parts.”37  Aberhart 
counted on his widespread appeal to carry the day and persuade the people to vote for his 
movement without sufficiently explaining Social Credit monetary policies.   
 Clearly, this campaign tactic had worked before for Aberhart in Alberta, but there 
was opposition to it from every corner of the political realm in Saskatchewan.  Indeed, 
opposition to Social Credit was not limited to political organizations.  Civil organizations 
also opposed Social Credit and intervened in an attempt to persuade the people of 
Saskatchewan not to vote for Aberhart.  The Donalda Civic League on May 27, 1938 
composed a dossier warning the people of Saskatchewan against voting for Social Credit.  
It believed strongly that Social Credit had been a completely negative force when it came 
to governing Alberta.  It began its letter to the people of Saskatchewan with a strongly-
worded introduction: 
In view of the invasion of your Province by the forces of the Aberhart 
Government, and the barrage of election twaddle with which you are being 
bombarded, with regard to the half-baked theory of economics called Social 
Credit, it has occurred to us that you might be interested in getting the views of 
the average rural elector in this part of Alberta.38 
 
                                                 
36 USSC, Diefenbaker Papers, 43.3, H. Hall to J. Diefenbaker, 19 May 1938. 
37 USSC, Diefenbaker Papers, 43.3, H. Hall to J. Diefenbaker, 19 May 1938. 
38 SAB, CCF Papers, II, 143, Dossier of Donald Civic League to the Electors of Saskatchewan, 27 May 
1938. 
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The Donalda Civic League’s dossier then explained how Social Credit government 
worked in Alberta: 
We have enjoyed the “God-given right to suffer” under the Social Credit 
Government for almost three years; we have seen it operate in a series of “starts, 
stops and reversals” that has been the most amazing display of legislative 
incompetence seen in any provincial government since Confederation, and WE 
ARE ABSOLUTELY FED UP WITH IT.39 
 
They explained that Aberhart’s promises to Albertans included monthly dividends, 
reduction of taxation, reduction of government costs, protection from seizure of property, 
interest free loans, all to be accomplished within eighteen months and within the limits of 
the constitution.40  The civic league went on to provide a detailed account of how 
Aberhart had failed to achieve his promises.  These included: no dividends, an increase as 
opposed to a decrease in taxation, expansion of government, no loans to farmers, and an 
attempt to control the press.41  The civic league believed strongly that the Aberhart 
government had been unsuccessful:  
If this government ever had a plan it has never yet seen fit to trot it out for the 
inspection of the people most concerned; as a matter of fact it was admitted by the 
Major Prophet of Fig Tree, before this Government was elected that any plan of 
Social Credit was impracticable within provincial limitations, and the Premier 
himself has admitted that he had no plan.  But the bogey of the banks and the 
dastardly financial interests makes good election material and the shadow boxing 
goes merrily on.42 
 
Social Credit may have had ideas but no clear plan of how to implement them.  It was a 
clear message of caution.  Aberhart had no plan.  The civic league concluded its dossier 
with a warning: 
                                                 
39 SAB, CCF Papers, II, 143, Dossier of Donald Civic League to the Electors of Saskatchewan, 27 May 
1938. 
40 SAB, CCF Papers, II, 143, Dossier of Donald Civic League to the Electors of Saskatchewan, 27 May 
1938. 
41 SAB, CCF Papers, II, 143, Dossier of Donald Civic League to the Electors of Saskatchewan, 27 May 
1938. 
42 SAB, CCF Papers, II, 143, Dossier of Donald Civic League to the Electors of Saskatchewan, 27 May 
1938. 
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Do not be misled; this government is through in Alberta and is well aware of the 
fact; hence its anxiety to gain a foothold in your Province.  Its theory is 
impracticable and unworkable and was discarded by reputable economists before 
Mr. Aberhart was born... we appeal to you, electors, of Saskatchewan, if you wish 
to avoid the “misery in the midst of poverty” which we have enjoyed in Alberta 
for the past three years, you will see to it on June 8th that you are not saddled with 
a similar system of chaos and confusion that can only result in delaying the return 
of prosperity to your province.43 
 
It was absolutely essential that the people of Saskatchewan avoid Social Credit at all cost.  
The civic league did not even recommend an alternative party; they simply stated that 
voters should avoid Social Credit, no matter what Premier Aberhart promised to give 
them during these trying times.   
 Social Credit was not prepared to fight the Saskatchewan provincial election of 
1938.  Although initially unwilling to campaign outside of Alberta and expressing his 
wish that the party within Saskatchewan organize its own affairs, Alberta Premier 
Aberhart was compelled to lead the movement himself in Saskatchewan.  This 
intervention was necessary because of Social Credit’s disorganization in Saskatchewan 
and Premier Patterson’s decision to call a snap election.  Aberhart mobilized his forces 
throughout the province in a strong attempt to convince the people of Saskatchewan of 
the benefit of voting Social Credit.  He used a variety of means at his disposal, including 
town halls, radio broadcasts and newspaper coverage to communicate his message.  
However, disorganization remained a constant theme throughout the campaign.  
Candidates for individual riding nominations had to be rushed, and many candidates 
ended up being ‘parachute’ candidates.  There was also spirited opposition to Social 
Credit. The CCF was concerned that Social Credit was going to damage their chances at 
forming government.  The Liberals, meanwhile, did not see Social Credit as a serious 
                                                 
43 SAB, CCF Papers, II, 143, Dossier of Donald Civic League to the Electors of Saskatchewan, 27 May 
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threat and as such were largely indifferent to them.  The Conservatives, still hurting from 
their previous electoral loss, were wary of the Social Credit movement.  Additionally, the 
Donalda Civic League from Alberta warned the voters of Saskatchewan that Social 
Credit could not and should not be trusted.  It remained to be seen whether Aberhart 
could repeat his 1935 Alberta victory in Saskatchewan in 1938. 
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Chapter Three 
Desolation, Desertion and Departure: The End of Social Credit in Saskatchewan 
 
 The Social Credit party, while gaining a significant amount of interest from the 
electorate of Saskatchewan, were only able to elect two Members of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLAs), Bill Roseland and John Herman.  Despite its efforts to appeal to the 
voters of Saskatchewan, Social Credit had been rejected.  This chapter will focus on the 
aftermath of the election, the remnants of the party’s organization, and Premier William 
Aberhart’s lack of interest in promoting the Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan.  
While a number of members of Social Credit continued to believe that Social Credit 
could have success, leadership of the progressive movement in Saskatchewan was 
grudgingly conceded to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.).   Indeed, 
many electors in Saskatchewan seemed to be more willing to trust the C.C.F. going 
forward at this point, as Social Credit had governed Alberta for three years and failed to 
deliver major reforms, with the C.C.F. was a brand new force.  Accusations between 
Social Creditors as to who was a true supporter also returned as a major post-election 
theme.  Significant evidence exists to suggest that several prominent Social Creditors 
were, indeed, turncoats. 
 The 1938 Saskatchewan election result proved disappointing for Social Credit 
organizers.  In a letter to Aberhart on June 9, 1938 John Hilton, the party’s pre-election 
secretary, wrote “I hope and pray that you may be sustained in the disappointment that I 
know you will have suffered with the rest of us and your good helpers.”1  Hilton’s 
                                                 
1 Provincial Archives of Alberta [hereafter PAA], Premier’s Papers, 1093, J. Hilton to W. Aberhart, 9 June 
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disappointment was mixed with optimism for the future, and that organizational work 
would continue going forward for the Social Credit movement.  But Hilton also believed 
that mistakes had been made in the campaign and that the path forward would not be 
easy: “I cannot help but say that I am now more sure than ever that we could have made a 
better show had we avoided the charge that you were dictating.”2  That Aberhart had 
largely led the campaign in Saskatchewan was an issue that comes up time and again in 
the archival record.  The principal reason that Aberhart had stepped into the campaign 
was because it had become obvious to him and the Social Credit government in Alberta 
that the Saskatchewan organizers of the movement were unable to accomplish anything 
on their own.  If Social Credit was to have any success in Saskatchewan, it was necessary 
for Aberhart and members of his cabinet to participate in the campaign. This involvement 
was a reluctant move for Aberhart since he was deeply absorbed with the affairs of 
Alberta and running the government. 
Figure 1.0.  Saskatchewan Election Results: 
Political Party Votes Cast % of Vote Candidates Elected 
Liberal 200,334 45.45 38 
C.C.F. 82,529 18.73 10 
Social Credit 70,084 15.90 2 
Conservative 52,315 11.87 0 
Unity 9,848 2.24 2 
Total 
Source: www.elections.sk.ca 
440,072 100.00 52 
 
                                                 
2 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, J. Hilton to W. Aberhart, 9 June 1938. 
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 After the election, Aberhart reverted to the position that he held before the writ 
was dropped.  W.E. Lake, a Social Credit supporter from Mervin, Saskatchewan, 
suggested that a paid director be appointed to handle matters.  Aberhart bluntly replied:  
I do not see how it would be possible for us to appoint a paid organizer, as no 
funds are available.  I think it would scarcely be fair to expect the people in 
Alberta to raise the funds necessary to carry on the Saskatchewan organization 
work.  The people in Saskatchewan who wish to have a sound organization 
formed should take some steps to get together and do some of the necessary 
foundation work in order that future progress may be on a solid basis.3 
 
With the failure of Social Credit to gain traction in Saskatchewan, Aberhart did not want 
much to do with the situation.  He now took the position, similar to his opinion before the 
election campaign, that if the people of Saskatchewan wanted a Social Credit 
government, then they had to accomplish this matter for themselves.   
 Interest in Social Credit did persist after the election.  Some people still wished to 
see Social Credit succeed in Saskatchewan and sought Aberhart’s opinion.  In a letter 
dated March 29, 1940, W. Ducklow of North Battleford, Saskatchewan gave Aberhart his 
congratulations on his re-election in Alberta, and thanked him for his support in the 1938 
Saskatchewan election, stating: “we feel that a Provincial executive should be set up.  
What is[sic] your wishes?  As to this and the method of organization should we not 
standardize with Alberta.  Wishing you every success.”4  Aberhart’s response on April 3 
was supportive but he was careful to warn that “it will be necessary, however, to be very 
careful that you do not cause another split in the ranks.”5  Indeed, the problems of 
leadership and loyalty within the Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan persisted after 
the election.  The difficulty largely revolved around who was a true supporter of Social 
                                                 
3 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to W. Lake, 14 July 1938. 
4 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Ducklow to W. Aberhart, 29 March 1940. 
5 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to W. Ducklow, 3 April 1940. 
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Credit and who was only promoting the movement for their own personal gain.  Aberhart 
discussed the potential of a united reform movement going forward in an April 24, 1940 
letter: 
It would seem to me, as I look over the situation, that it will be necessary for the 
leaders in the Reform Movement in Saskatchewan to get together in some definite 
way honestly, before anything can be done in Saskatchewan.   
 
I have heard that Mr. Herman [Social Credit MLA] is definitely taking a stand on 
the side of the C.C.F. and admitted that he took the name of Social Credit in his 
provincial seat at the request of George H. Williams [leader of the CCF].  I can 
hardly believe such a statement but there it is.6 
 
Aberhart’s fear that Herman was a secret CCF supporter was just one of several examples 
of where Social Party loyalty was in doubt.  John Hilton shared these concerns.  On April 
9, 1940, he advised Aberhart: 
I’m told that A.C. Stewart, M.L.A. for Yorkton will visit you soon.  Am I too 
forward in saying that he is a man that I should caution you about?  He served in 
the late Anderson Govt. here.  Has been a very free liver.  Is considered the leader 
in the Sask. House of the ‘National Reform’.  Was very agreeable to the C.C.F. 
Candidate in Yorkton, Mr. Castleden, objected to any opposition to this party in 
the last election. 7 
 
Aberhart responded: “it would seem to me that affairs down there are in a horrible mess.  
I am afraid the situation in poor old Saskatchewan will be difficult to handle.”8 
 Even the elected Social Creditors questioned the loyalty of those around them.  In 
a letter to Aberhart dated April 26, 1940, Carl Stewart, an independent MLA who 
presented himself as a progressive as well as a supporter of Social Credit, identified 
several people whom he believed to not be true Social Creditors: 
I do not know who your Saskatchewan advisers have been but if they are men 
such as Colonel Arnold and Messrs. Hilton & Haver of Saskatoon, then the advice 
you are receiving is entirely erroneous and in my opinion Messrs. Arnold & 
                                                 
6 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to C. Stewart, 24 April 1940. 
7 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, J. Hilton to W. Aberhart, 9 April 1940. 
8 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to J. Hilton, 26 April 1940. 
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Hilton at least were merely tools of the Liberal Party in the last Federal Election 
and the results in the constituencies where they ran namely, Saskatoon and 
Weyburn, show that the people were wise as to who was backing them and where 
they got the money to run.9 
 
Stewart also vouched for Herman’s credibility.  Aberhart, in his reply to Stewart on May 
1, 1940, stated that “you have lifted quite a load from my mind in advising me of Mr. 
Herman.  I have always felt that he is a square shooter and could hardly believe the 
rumours that have been floating this way about him.”10  All this conflicting information 
only helps to further show the difficulty in drawing clear conclusions about who 
supported what policies, and who was merely involved in politics for their own personal 
gain. 
 As it turned out, Aberhart would have been wise to have followed Hilton’s advice 
regarding Carl Stewart.  In a letter labelled ‘strictly private and confidential’, Attorney 
General of Saskatchewan T.C. Davis wrote to federal Minister of Agriculture Jimmy 
Gardiner about an in-depth conversation that he had with Stewart: “I would recommend, 
that when you are out here again, that your path should in some unexpected way cross 
his, that you go out of your way to have a chat with him along the lines of my chat.”11  
Davis finished his letter to Gardiner by stating his belief that “anything that can be done 
to get him gradually over the Liberal Party, would have a far-reaching effect in this 
province.”12  An enclosed note, dated June 8, 1939, is a fascinating look into Stewart’s 
political background and potential future.  Davis wrote that the two men spoke frankly to 
each other, and that Davis “suggested to him [Stewart], that if he intended to pursue a 
                                                 
9 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, C. Stewart to W. Aberhart, 29 April 1940. 
10 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1093, W. Aberhart to C. Stewart, 1 May 1940. 
11 Saskatchewan Archives Board [hereafter SAB], Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, T.C. Davis to J.G. 
Gardiner, 9 June 1939. 
12 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, T.C. Davis to J.G. Gardiner, 9 June 1939. 
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political life, the time was ripe when he should affiliate himself with one of the old line 
parties and that the only place he could go, if he decided to pursue this course, was to the 
Liberal Party.”13  Davis wrote that Stewart’s reply was as follows: 
He stated that he went to Yorkton as a Liberal and that the leaders of the Liberal 
Party there, by their attitude towards him, drove him out of the Party, and that 
they have been fighting for twenty years as a result.  He says he has always been a 
Liberal in the broad sense of the term.14 
 
Stewart, elected as an independent candidate in the previous election, had worked 
towards organizing a unity movement and had corresponded with Aberhart.  He refrained 
from discussing his Aberhart connection in the course of this conversation with Davis, 
but mentioned “that he was very bitter against [leader George] Williams of the C.C.F.  He 
stated, that during the session, Williams accused him of favouring the Liberals, as against 
the C.C.F., and failing to co-operate with the C.C.F., and that Williams objected to his 
saying anything of a commendatory nature in connection with the polices being followed 
by the government.”15  John Herman even gets a mention in this note.  Davis writes that 
Stewart told him “the C.C.F. are busily engaged in the Melville Provincial seat, trying to 
undermine Herman and that Herman is very bitter about it.”16  All told, Stewart had 
become frustrated with the reform movement as a whole in Saskatchewan, having 
exhausted most of his options. 
 The remainder of Davis’ note concerns Stewart’s path forward.  Davis notes that 
Stewart “is not very averse to going back into the Liberal Party again and is coming to 
the conclusion, that he and others of his frame of mind could perhaps get further in 
                                                 
13 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
14 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
 
15 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
16 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
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having their viewpoint met, by pressure within the Liberal Party, than by pressure 
without.”17  Davis had obviously earned himself a captive audience with Stewart.  It is 
worth noting, however, that this conversation came nearly a full year before the 
correspondence between Aberhart and Stewart in which Stewart portrays himself as a 
man supportive of Social Credit and advising Aberhart of the way forward in 
Saskatchewan.  The Gardiner documentation suggests that Stewart was already interested 
in returning to the Liberal fold, and it is with this biased perspective that Stewart’s 
correspondence should be understood.  The Davis note continues by discussing the 
niceties of how Stewart could potentially return to the Liberal Party: 
His [Stewart’s] trouble is that he has been fighting the Liberals for twenty years 
and he can’t gracefully come out whole-heartedly in their support but he is 
inclined to do this gradually. 
 
His present frame of mind is, that at the next session of the legislature, he is going 
to go after the C.C.F. hammer and tongs, and ask to be moved away from and 
may ultimately walk across the floor of the House in support of the government.18 
 
Davis concluded his note restating his opinion that Stewart could be convinced to support 
the government, “with a little judicious handling”, before the next election.19  This letter 
and its corresponding note are the most concrete evidence available indicating the 
problem with determining the affiliations of the various political actors in the 
Saskatchewan election of 1938.  During 1939, Stewart was actively corresponding with 
the Attorney General of Saskatchewan about potentially rejoining the Liberal Party and 
abandoning his position on the opposition benches.  A year later, he was writing letters to 
Premier Aberhart discussing personalities within the Social Credit movement and 
                                                 
17 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
18 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
19 SAB, Premier Gardiner Fonds, VII, 5, Note of Davis’ conversation with Stewart, 8 June 1939. 
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whether they could be trusted or not.  Clearly, the issue of trust within the Social Credit 
party remained a significant issue. 
 As for John Herman, one of the two Social Credit MLAs elected in the 1938 
Saskatchewan, the C.C.F. records help to clarify matters about his political affiliations to 
a certain degree.  Initially, the papers support the argument that Herman was, indeed, a 
C.C.F. supporter.  In the minutes of a meeting of the Provincial Council held on June 18-
19, 1938, several questions were posed to Herman regarding his possible support for the 
C.C.F. in the legislature and for C.C.F. policies.  The response, as recorded in the records 
of the minute book, was as follows: 
Mr. J. L. Phelps, Mrs. D. Pope, and Mr. Stork were appointed as a Committee to 
meet Mr. Herman.  The following questions were submitted to Mr. Herman, 
which were answered to the satisfaction of the Council. 
 
1. Has Mr. Herman given any pledge to the Social Credit Group or to Mr. 
Aberhart.  Ans. NO 
2. Will Mr. Herman guarantee to hold in strict confidence all matters 
discussed in Caucus and that they be not made known to anyone.  Ans.  
YES. 
3. Will Mr. Herman be willing to abide by the decision of the caucus on all 
matters of policy.  Ans.  YES. 
4. Will Mr. Herman be willing to support the principles of the CCF platform 
on the floor of the legislature.  Ans.  YES.20 
 
If ever there was a clear sign of support by Herman of the C.C.F. movement, these 
answers would have certainly clarified the matter to the satisfaction of the provincial 
council.  A motion was quickly carried to allow Herman to sit in on this council 
meeting.21  What is of particular significance is that Herman, in his answers to the above 
questions, essentially repudiated everything that he had stood for in the election.  He had 
no devotion to Aberhart, no devotion to Social Credit, agreed to support all C.C.F. 
                                                 
20 SAB, CCF Papers, I., 2, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting held in Regina, 18 and 19 June 1938. 
21 SAB, CCF Papers, I., 2, Minutes of Provincial Council Meeting held in Regina, 18 and 19 June 1938. 
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policies, and made a ‘guarantee’ of secrecy.  This agreement marked a significant 
reversal for Herman from his election platform, and further portrays him as a turncoat.  
Indeed, George Williams was quite optimistic over the outcome of this meeting and made 
his opinion known to a Hugh McLean in a letter written June 21, 1938.  In it, he stated 
that because Social Credit did not stay out of the election campaign, hampering the 
C.C.F.’s electoral success, the progressive forces in Saskatchewan, in part, “have 10 
CCF, 1 Social Credit man who really is CCF and has already joined the caucus… and 1 
real Social Credit who like most them knows just exactly nothing.”22   
 Of course, the characterization of Herman as a Social Creditor in name only is 
difficult to ascertain in a satisfactory way.  Williams, in particular, had decided by the 
end of 1938 that “insofar as the CCF is concerned people either must be in it or out of it.  
Mr. Herman can make his choice.”23  The minutes of a meeting of the C.C.F. executive 
held on August 13, 1939 serve to show the developing attitude of the CCF leadership 
towards the two Social Credit members of the legislature.  The membership committee 
wished to make it clear to the executive that “in the event of Mr. Fred Herman and Mr. H. 
K. Warren applying for membership in the CCF that their membership be not granted in 
view of the fact that the constitution prohibits them from being members of the 
organization.”24  Herman, for his part, still needed to make a decision regarding whether 
he would agree to sit in the C.C.F. caucus or remain true to Social Credit and accept the 
influence of Aberhart.  In a letter written to George Williams, Herman attempted to 
clarify the situation as he sees it.  This letter, however, is written in a manner in which 
Herman is able to remove responsibility for his own specific political affiliation: 
                                                 
22 SAB, CCF Papers, II., 168, G. Williams to H. McLean, June 21, 1938. 
23 SAB, CCF Papers, II,. 287(16), G. Williams to F. Makaroff, December 8, 1938. 
24 SAB, CCF Papers, I,. 2, Minutes of an Executive Meeting, 13 August 1939. 
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Relative to the matter of joining up with the CCF, my Executive of Melville 
Provincial Constituency sometime ago instructed me to maintain my identity as a 
Social Credit member but to cooperate with the CCF in every way possible and at 
the same time to work toward unity of the progressive forces.   
 
Consequently as each constituency has independence under social credit, I must at 
this time decline the invitation of the CCF Executive [to become a member of the 
CCF Opposition] but can assure your executive that so long as the interests of the 
people are paramount with the CCF they will have the whole cooperation of 
myself as a member of the Legislature.25  
 
In this passage, Herman diplomatically but successfully manages to ‘pass the buck’ 
regarding his affiliation in the legislature from himself to his constituency association.  
He paints a picture of being a faithful servant of the wishes of members of the Social 
Credit party within his constituency, but does not alienate the C.C.F. executive at the 
same time.  Herman leaves the door open to changes which may occur depending on the 
political winds. 
 Meanwhile, other organizers of the Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan 
continued to write Aberhart about the best way forward.  Malcolm Haver, the man acting 
as general secretary and organizer on his own initiative prior to the election, thought it 
might be helpful if he contested a forthcoming by-election in Saskatoon and sought 
Aberhart’s opinion. The Alberta premier’s reply of August 1, 1940, must have come as a 
significant disappointment.  He stated that it would be impossible to provide any financial 
support from Alberta and that “your progressive forces in Saskatchewan are becoming so 
broken up that it would appear to me very difficult to hope for success under the 
circumstances.”26  Aberhart repeated his pessimistic views in another letter to Lillie 
Beirne of Saskatoon: “I really feel it is going to be a mistake to attempt to do anything in 
                                                 
25 SAB, CCF Papers, I., 2, Minutes of an Executive Meeting, 7 January 1939. 
26 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to M. Haver, 1 August 1940. 
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this by-election in Saskatoon on behalf of Social Credit… You know, it is my personal 
belief that Saskatchewan will be the last province that will ever stand for reform.”27   
 Aberhart clearly did not have much optimism about the situation going forward in 
Saskatchewan.  Nor did he have much reason to believe that the situation might get 
better: as time passed, even more conflicting information arrived at his office.  Henry 
Brachman, a general merchant from Success, Saskatchewan, wrote to Aberhart on 
December 3, 1941 asking the leaders of the Social Credit Party of Alberta help in saving 
the movement in Saskatchewan: 
Our friends in this part of the country would like to see you take the initiative in 
calling a national conference and try to do something for us in Saskatchewan so 
that we may be able to get going again and be able to lay the foundation for a 
truly national movement and party that will have the ability to guide the destinies 
of our country when this war is over.28 
 
Brachman’s request was not uncommon among Social Crediters in Saskatchewan.  
Having had little success in organizational matters, members of the movement in 
Saskatchewan turned to Aberhart for help.  Aberhart’s response to Brachman on 
December 11, 1940 was cautious regarding intervention in Saskatchewan, quite similar to 
other exchanges with other Saskatchewan Social Crediters.  Aberhart stated “I would be 
very pleased indeed to do anything I can to gather together the disjointed parts of the 
Progressive Movement in Saskatchewan but I do not desire to have the criticism levelled 
at me that I am trying to interfere in another province.”29 Aberhart did, however, ask 
Brachman to provide him with a list of names of people who “are really sold to the Social 
Credit Movement and would put their efforts to a great organization there.”30  Brachman 
                                                 
27 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to L. Beirne, 7 August 1940. 
28 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, H. Brachman to W. Aberhart, 3 December 1941. 
29 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to H. Brachman, 11 December 1940. 
30 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to H. Brachman, 11 December 1940. 
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dutifully put together the list, but then expressed his opinion in a subsequent letter that 
many who identified themselves as Social Creditors “are just adventurers and 
opportunists for personal gain”.31  It is difficult to imagine how anyone would be able to 
make any sense out of the conflicting information arriving at Aberhart’s office, especially 
with individuals claiming that another man was a turncoat and not to be trusted. 
 Aberhart continued to express his disappointment with the affairs of the Social 
Credit movement in Saskatchewan.  As late as September 1941, Aberhart wrote to W.J. 
McCallum of Brownlee, Saskatchewan, complaining about the way that the 1938 election 
had been handled and wondering what the path going forward should be.  Of note in this 
letter is a specific reference to the selection of candidates for constituencies in the 
election: 
You (McCallum) have asked me if we intend to have a Social Credit candidate in 
the Morse Constituency to contest in the next Provincial election.   
 
In reply permit me to say that we did the best we knew how at the last election 
and received a real rebuke in the way the people voted.  We are attempting to 
organise a Federal Association in Winnipeg on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of 
October.  When we have held these meetings we will be able to judge how far 
Saskatchewan would join in it by the attendance and interest shown.   
 
In reply to your statement that it would be better to run a candidate who lives in 
the constituency I would like to say that we tried to get that in the last election but 
there was no one who would stand.32 
 
In this letter, Aberhart’s statements challenge the perception given by earlier accounts of 
the election that Aberhart willingly appointed ‘parachute’ candidates in constituencies.  
While the documentation supports the argument that Aberhart did indeed end up 
appointing candidates who did not live in the ridings in which they ran, the letter 
                                                 
31 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, H. Brachman to W. Aberhart, 7 January 1941. 
32 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to W. McCallum, 26 September 1941. 
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indicates that Aberhart did so rather unwillingly.  This example is yet further proof that 
Aberhart only intervened in the Saskatchewan election unwillingly. 
 By the early 1940s, interest in Social Credit remained strong among some people, 
but it was clear that the few who were still involved in promoting Social Credit were not 
receiving much support.  John Hilton asked Aberhart on January 31, 1942 for literature to 
help rekindle interest in Social Credit in Saskatchewan.  He specifically wished to have 
something written along the lines of a “brochure on the subject ‘Achievements of Social 
Credit.’  Too long we have taken abuse and ridicule without any reply and after all, it 
does appear to me the philosophy of ‘turning the other cheek’ can be carried too far.”33  
Aberhart’s response on February 3, 1942 showed impatience with Hilton: 
I am afraid that you are getting entirely out of touch with things, as you suggest 
we write up a brochure on the subject of ‘Achievements of Social Credit’.  Over a 
year ago we published a little booklet entitled ‘The Records Tell the Story’.  Of 
course I suppose another one could well be written on what has happened since 
then.34 
 
This rebuke might have been a reason for Hilton to stop writing Aberhart.  This lack of 
correspondence should serve as evidence that interest in Social Credit in Saskatchewan 
was in a serious decline.  Indeed, the overall amount of correspondence between Aberhart 
and his Saskatchewan supporters shrinks considerably beginning in the second half of 
1941.  However, people like Hilton remained committed to the movement.  In a letter to 
F.E. Werry of Reward, Saskatchewan dated July 30, 1942, Hilton largely blamed the 
lessening of interest to external factors beyond the party’s control, stating that “while it is 
true our Social Credit organization has been languishing and the ranks of our vanguard 
are now in other lands and many in war work, it seems to me the principles are just as 
                                                 
33 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, J. Hilton to W. Aberhart, 31 January 1942. 
34 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to J. Hilton, 3 February 1942. 
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sound and the pioneer effort is worthy of maintenance and revivifying.”35  The Second 
World War certainly had a significant aspect on all elements of society and took its 
financial and human tool.  Still, it is difficult to see where these statements of optimism 
were grounded in any sense of reality.   
 Aberhart’s lack of optimism for the Saskatchewan situation continued into the 
second half of 1942.  Indeed, he eventually came to the conclusion that Social Credit in 
Saskatchewan was dead, and that there was really no hope for the movement any longer.  
On September 4, 1942, Aberhart wrote a response to a letter from Mrs. M.L. Krogh of 
Marshall, Saskatchewan.  In it, he specifically addressed the persistent issue of leadership 
within the Social Credit Party of Saskatchewan and the already divided political 
landscape: 
I can quite understand people taking the second best if there are not sufficient 
leaders to carry the banner for Social Credit…take Saskatchewan for example: I 
can quite understand that there is just one choice the people have to make, that is 
to vote Liberal or to vote C.C.F.  If Social Credit were to go into Saskatchewan at 
the present time, we would just break the ranks of the C.C.F. and allow the 
Liberal Party to go in on a minority vote.  This of course would be folly on our 
part.36 
 
Aberhart had clearly abandoned any hope of spreading the Social Credit movement into 
provinces outside Alberta.  His primary motivation was to avoid splitting the ranks of 
progressive-minded citizens and to prevent the Liberals from winning elections.  With 
such little chance of success, there was no point in wasting the resources of the Alberta 
branch of the Social Credit movement on Saskatchewan. 
 Aberhart also continued to cite the necessity of running the provincial government 
in Alberta as a reason why he could do little in the way of support.  Even a letter from a 
                                                 
35 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, J. Hilton to F. Werry, 30 July 1942. 
36 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to M. Krogh, 4 September 1942. 
  
 
65  
Social Credit supporter suggesting that support for the CCF in Saskatchewan was waning 
failed to sway him.  Aberhart’s short response of November 18, 1942, articulated his 
dismissive view of the situation in Saskatchewan: 
I would not be a bit surprised that you were absolutely right and that the warmth 
of enthusiasm for the C.C.F. would wane down to a minimum.  Of course I do not 
know who else the people in Saskatchewan will vote for if the Social Crediters 
over there are not strong enough even to put up candidates. 
I feel that we here have so much to do that we could not undertake anything 
more.37 
 
This letter was the second last piece of correspondence between the Premier’s Office and 
a Social Credit supporter in Saskatchewan.  The last one was a reply Aberhart wrote to 
Wm. Alex Seymour of Glenellen, Saskatchewan on December 8, 1942.  Aberhart told 
Seymour that the Social Credit’s 1938 campaign may have backfired, and “that it was our 
action that elected the Liberals again, and so forth and so on.”38  He believed that there 
simply were not enough people such as Seymour in Saskatchewan who would take a 
strong stand for Social Credit.  Besides, the CCF seemed poised to win the next 
provincial election: 
When I heard of your election coming on again, in spite of what happened after 
the last one, I interviewed some of the people in Saskatchewan and I was told that 
the people in Saskatchewan were going to try to elect a C.C.F. Government, and 
therefore it would be better for us to stay out, for we would merely divide the vote 
and neither of us would get in.  Now, if the people of Saskatchewan want a 
socialist government, I have nothing whatever to say to them; that is their 
business.  I personally am against regimentation, rationalization, or socialization 
of any of the rights of the people.  I want freedom in every sense of the word.39 
 
Aberhart had conceded that the Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan was dead.  The 
record of correspondence between the Premier’s office and Saskatchewan Social Credit 
essentially ends at this point.  No one could ever make the claim that Aberhart had not 
                                                 
37 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to J. Hilton, 18 November 1942. 
38 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to W. Seymour, 8 December 1942. 
39 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to W. Seymour, 8 December 1942. 
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tried to bring Social Credit to Saskatchewan.  He just did not have the organizational 
structure necessary in the province to transform interest in Social Credit to support. 
 With the continued disorganization and serious questioning of where loyalties lay 
among party operatives, it comes as no surprise that the post-1938 period of the Social 
Credit Party’s history in Saskatchewan closely resembles that of the pre-election period.  
Aberhart had been forced to personally intervene in the 1938 election campaign.  That 
intervention, though actually hampered Social Credit’s chances as opposed to helping 
them.  Aberhart was portrayed as an intruder who had no real connection with the 
province.  He detested this characterisation as an interloper and an invader in the affairs 
of Saskatchewan, and consequently decided to leave the Social Credit movement in the 
province to local organisers.  If the people of Saskatchewan wanted Social Credit, they 
would find the message of Social Credit appealing on its own merits.  If not, Aberhart 
accepted the will of the people. 
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Conclusion 
 The Saskatchewan election of 1938 proved to be a tidewater election in the 
political history of Saskatchewan.  It would be the last election in which an old-line 
political party would win until the early 1960s.  The forces of progressive political 
ideologies were moving forward at a rapid pace.  However, this election would not be the 
one in which a reform political movement would change the face of Saskatchewan 
politics.  The Social Credit Party would divide the progressive forces in Saskatchewan 
until the 1944 election, when Tommy Douglas would take the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation to power.  A struggling Conservative Party would also play a 
role in further dividing the vote.  Most importantly, the electorate of Saskatchewan 
continued to have faith in the Liberal party and was not ready for “radical” alternatives.  
Premier William Aberhart of Alberta was able to generate considerable interest in the 
Social Credit Party during the 1938 Saskatchewan election campaign, but had been 
unable to convert this curiosity into support.  Infighting and poor organization among 
Social Creditors in Saskatchewan would also cause difficulty in moving the party forward 
in securing electoral support.   
 The Saskatchewan electorate in 1938 had been looking for a way out of the Great 
Depression.  They were faced with one of two choices: either take a chance on a new 
political party with untested ideas on how to improve the economy, or stick with a party 
that was familiar, but had not been very successful in solving the problems of the 
depression.  Meanwhile, the progressive forces in Saskatchewan were largely fractured.   
As a result, Social Credit found a considerable amount of difficulty securing support.  As 
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the ‘new’ party in Saskatchewan, Social Credit needed to quickly establish itself as a 
viable alternative. 
 But Social Credit was saddled with another problem.  It quickly became clear 
while examining the primary source materials that a considerable amount of infighting 
occurred within the movement in the years leading up to the 1938 election.  Most party 
members took the side of one organiser or another in the belief that their idea of Social 
Credit was the correct one, or that they were the one sufficiently dedicated to the 
movement.  There was a significant level of distrust among party members who believed 
that other members were not true Social Creditors and that they were only in it for 
themselves.  This theme is common throughout the materials, and persists from the 
beginning of Social Credit’s formation in Saskatchewan right through to the end of 
serious organisation in the early 1940s.  As members schemed against each other, the 
progress of the movement went nowhere.  When the election was called, support for 
Social Credit had completely stalled.   
 Premier Aberhart, who had been extremely reluctant to intervene previously in 
Saskatchewan, repeatedly citing the affairs of Alberta as the reason for this hesitancy, 
removed the authority of the Social Credit Party of Saskatchewan in conducting the 
election campaign and placed it under the management of the Western Social Credit 
Board, with himself as de facto leader.  He led numerous rallies across the province in an 
attempt to generate as much support for Social Credit as possible.  However, the other 
established political parties in Saskatchewan were not receptive to Social Credit and their 
economic ideas.  Social Credit was attacked from all sides, as “both the Liberals and CCF 
responded [to Social Credit] by characterizing Alberta premier William Aberhart as a 
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despot intent on ruling the province from Edmonton.”1   However, as this thesis has 
shown, Aberhart only ended up playing a role in the Saskatchewan election campaign 
because local Social Credit party members could not handle their own affairs.  Social 
Credit was rejected, winning only two seats, and Aberhart returned to Alberta, resigned to 
letting local Social Credit organizers in Saskatchewan carry the party banner.  Aberhart 
also returned to his earlier, pre-campaign stance that he would not intervene in the affairs 
of another province.  It was his observation that, by leading the campaign in 
Saskatchewan, he had opened himself up to the perception that he was an interloper.  
Aberhart reflected after the campaign, in response to a letter from a supporter asking for 
assistance in further organisational matters, that “I would be very pleased indeed to do 
anything I can to gather together the disjointed parts of the Progressive Movement in 
Saskatchewan but I do not desire to have the criticism levelled at me that I am trying to 
interfere in another province.”2  With the election over and interest in Social Credit 
having largely evaporated, the movement was dead by the end of 1940.   
 One noteworthy factor which had appeared time and again in the research 
materials was Social Credit’s inability to have formed any kind of meaningful alliance 
with any of the other parties contesting this election.  Aberhart had rejected the idea of 
teaming up with the CCF, and few other progressive movements had any real strength at 
all.  As a result, the voters of Saskatchewan ended up with a continuation of the Liberal 
government.  The CCF, which did make overtures to Social Credit to run under a united 
banner, ended up proving to be the strongest of the opposition parties and the most 
appealing alternative to the Liberals by the time of the next election.  Continued 
                                                 
1 William Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary: Fifth House, 2005), 324. 
2 Provincial Archives of Alberta [hereafter PAA], Premier’s Papers, 1094, W. Aberhart to H. Brachman, 11 
December 1940. 
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infighting in Social Credit Circles ensured that the movement would remain weak.  
Again, a dearth of leadership within the Saskatchewan branch of the party would 
ultimately prove fatal.  The CCF, on the other hand, was not saddled with this problem, 
as they would soon replace George Williams with future Premier Tommy Douglas as 
leader. 
 The Social Credit movement in Saskatchewan, largely running on the same 
policies as the Alberta branch of the Social Credit movement, is an integral element in 
understanding the political culture in Saskatchewan and the nature of prairie populist 
political movements during the 1930s.  While researching through the primary source 
materials, several important contrasts between Social Credit and the other political 
organisations in Saskatchewan become obvious.  First, the Liberals and CCF were well 
organised.  In contrast, the Saskatchewan wing of the Social Credit Party was in a 
constant state of chaos.  As a result, Aberhart felt it was his duty to take charge of the 
campaign during the election.  Second, it was difficult to ascertain who was a true Social 
Creditor and who was simply in it for their own personal benefit.  Indeed, the title of this 
thesis derives from this theme.  Despite all of the research conducted, it is still and will 
remain impossible to ever determine with complete certainty who was a Social Creditor 
in both name and practice.  Just one example of this theme is shown below: 
Regarding your impression that Mr. Needham is favourable to the CCF and to 
uniting with them.  Frankly, Mr. Aberhart, I do not share this impression.  I know 
exactly where that propaganda originated and that is with Malcolm Haver and 
Hinkson of Regina.  These men have both worked for the Liberal party ever since 
they began to camouflage as Social Crediters.  They are just adventurers and 
opportunists for personal gain.  Hinkson was Haver’s candidate for the presidency 
of Saskatchewan Social Credit at the 1937 convention in opposition to Mr. 
Needham.3 
 
                                                 
3 PAA, Premier’s Papers, 1094, H. Brachman to W. Aberhart, 14 March 1941. 
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In several other letters between Aberhart and Saskatchewan Social Credit supporters, 
many people frequently accuse each other of treacherous activity. 
 One other noteworthy fact that should be mentioned in comparing Social Credit 
and the CCF between Alberta and Saskatchewan is that the CCF did not have the kind of 
opportunity to develop in Alberta politics during this time that Social Credit did in 
Saskatchewan’s politics.  This is due to the fact that the CCF was associated with the 
previous government of Alberta, the United Farmer’s of Alberta (UFA), who had been 
voted out of office due to the fact that they had not been able to deal with the challenges 
of the Great Depression in Alberta.   
 It must be stressed that this research is important to understanding the nature of 
the political culture of both Alberta and Saskatchewan.  One might have expected the 
Social Credit movement to have appeal in Saskatchewan because it had success in 
Alberta, but it did not turn out that way.  This thesis does not support a conclusion that 
the politics of Saskatchewan and Alberta are fundamentally different.  Instead, this paper 
suggests that the three greatest factors which prevented Social Credit from having success 
in Saskatchewan were disorganisation, disunity, and disbelief within the internal party 
structure.  The party was not well prepared for the election, having failed to establish a 
coherent chain of command with one centralised party mechanism.  Along the same lines, 
Social Credit struggled with a lack of unity, with its members constantly fighting among 
themselves.  Finally, the issue of opportunism, with supporters who did not actually 
believe in Social Credit, was endemic, with no one really able to determine who was a 
true Social Creditor and who was only in it for themselves. 
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